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The Supreme Court's Abortion Jurisprudence: Will the
Supreme Court Pass the "Albatross" 1
Back to the States?
Since the Supreme Court decided Roe v. Wade,2 the Court and state
legislatures have battled to define the limits on a state's power to regu-
late a woman's decision of whether to have an abortion. The conflict
began with Roe, in which the Supreme Court established a woman's fun-
damental right to choose an abortion. Roe invalidated the majority of
existing state abortion statutes,3 and replaced them with the Court's tri-
mester approach. The trimester approach restricted the states' ability to
regulate the area.
Roe caused sweeping change in abortion regulation and shifted the
traditional balance between federal and state power in the abortion-legis-
lation area. Prior to Roe, state legislatures had broad-ranging power to
regulate abortion. Roe shifted this power to the federal level and, partic-
ularly, the Supreme Court by giving the Supreme Court the power to
strictly scrutinize state abortion legislation.
While Roe established a woman's fundamental right to choose an
abortion, the decision also identified the compelling state interests re-
garding abortion. These aspects of Roe defined the boundary lines in the
ensuing conflict between the Court and the states. The' trimester ap-
proach identified three compelling state interests:4 safeguarding mater-
I Professor Ely, in his article, Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE
LJ. 920 (1973), predicted that Roe would be a durable decision because the state legislatures would
be content to remove "this particular albatross [the abortion issue]" from their necks. Id. at 946-47.
Professor Ely does not support Roe's reasoning and criticizes it as "bad constitutional law because it
is not constitutional law and doesn't try to be." Id. at 947. As this Note argues, many states have not
been content to pass responsibility for this issue on to the Court. The ensuing battle has created
problems for both the Court and the state legislatures. This Note will trace the evolution of that
battle and suggest a solution to alleviate the conflict.
2 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
3 Twenty-eight states had abortion statutes similar to the Texas statute which prohibited abor-
tions except to save the mother's life: Arizona, Connecticut, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky,
Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New
Hampshire, NewJersey, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Dakota,
Tennessee, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. Id. at 118 n.2.
Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973), the companion case to Roe, invalidated fourteen state stat-
utes modeled after the ALI model. Roe, 410 U.S. at 140 n.37. These states included Arkansas,
California, Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Kansas, Maryland, Mississippi, New Mexico, North
Carolina, Oregon, South Carolina, Virginia. Id.
Alaska, Hawaii, New York, and Washington had repealed the criminal penalties for abortions
performed in the early stages of pregnancy. Id.
4 The Court's decision to recognize only three compelling state interests negated other impor-
tant state interests regarding abortion. The Court's trimester approach excluded state objectives
such as preferring childbirth to abortion and protecting pregnant minors. Thus, because the Court
did not identify these interests as compelling, the state could not promote them because these inter-
ests could not justify restricting the abortion decision within the Court's trimester approach. See
infra note 9. See generally N. REDLICH, B. SCHWARTZ & J. A-rANAsio, CONSTTUTONAL LAw 501-02
(1989).
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nal health, maintaining medical standards, and protecting potential life.5
From 1973 to the present, state legislatures have passed legislation re-
stricting abortions by promoting these compelling interests, particularly
the potential life of the fetus. The Court struck down the majority of
these statutes because either they violated the trimester framework or
infringed upon the woman's freedom of choice. During this period, the
Court increased the level of scrutiny it applied to state abortion regula-
tions in order to ensure that they did not overly burden the woman's
fundamental right to an abortion.6
The conflict intensified throughout the Court's abortion decisions
from Roe to Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists,
in 1986. 7 The escalating tension between the Court and the states high-
lighted the trimester framework's inability to accommodate the complex
abortion issue, and illustrated the need for change. The Court's in-
creased scrutiny had at least two negative effects. First, state legislatures
generally have been unable to meet the Court's demanding and shifting
standard of review when formulating abortion regulations. 8 Increased
5 Justice Blackmun explained that the weight of these interests varied during the pregnancy and
rejected claims that the fundamental right recognized in Roe was absolute.
The Court's decisions recognizing a right of privacy also acknowledge that some state regu-
lation in areas protected by that right is appropriate. [A] State may properly assert impor-
tant interests in safeguarding health, in maintaining medical standards, and in protecting
potential life. At some point in pregnancy, these respective interests become sufficiently
compelling to sustain regulation of the factors that govern the abortion decision. The pri-
vacy right involved, therefore, cannot be said to be absolute. In fact, it is not clear to us that
the claim asserted by some amid that one has an unlimited right to do with one's body as
one pleases bears a close relationship to the right to privacy previously articulated in the
Court's decisions. The Court has refused to recognize an unlimited right of this kind in the
past.
Roe, 410 U.S. at 154.
6 The Court's abortion decisions have been truly a battle between the Court and the states.
After the Court struck down the vast majority of state abortion statutes, see supra note 3, the states
responded by passing legislation affecting their interests in maternal health, medical standards, and
potential life. Their aggressive legislation sought to define the general terms of the trimester ap-
proach. Some regulations have withstood judicial scrutiny, see, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Central
Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976)(spousal and parental consent requirements held unconsti-
tutional)(recordkeeping and patient consent requirements upheld). Other cases have not withstood
judicial scrutiny, see, e.g., Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476
U.S. 747 (1986)(mandatory information about risks of abortion, possible availability of medical
assistance and child support, and availability of printed matter concerning characteristics of fetus
and organizations to assist with alternatives to abortion, and provisions regulating postviability abor-
tions held unconstitutional); City of Akron v. Akron Center of Reproductive Health, Inc., 462 U.S.
416 (1983)(holding unconstitutional a city ordinance requiring physician to inform pregnant wo-
man, before her consent to abortion, of fetus' state of development, risks of abortion, and availability
of assistance from agencies; a 24-hour waiting period after consent; a requirement of hospitalization
for all second-trimester abortions; a parental-consent requirement; a disposal-of-fetal-remains provi-
sion). The states, however, continued to test the Roe framework with more restrictive regulation.
For example, the states have fought particularly hard to exert greater control over a minor's abor-
tion decision than over an adult's decision. See, e.g., Akron, 462 U.S. 416 (1983); Bellotti v. Baird, 443
U.S. 622 (1979) [hereinafter Bellotti II]; Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976). In response, the Court has
strictly scrutinized state regulations in that area, insuring that Roe is not undercut by restrictive regu-
lation. See Bellotti 1H, 443 U.S. 416 (1979). The Court and the states have continuously exchanged
attacks attempting to carve greater areas of control for each opposing side in this battle. Each side,
in turn, has taken a more aggressive and entrenched stance in supporting its position, the result
being an impasse in this country's abortion regulations.
7 476 U.S. 747 (1986).
8 The Supreme Court has upheld some state abortion legislation. These regulations have
tended to be less intrusive on the woman's freedom of choice. For example, a regulation requiring a
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scrutiny prevented the states from furthering their legitimate interests
enumerated in Roe's trimester framework, as well as other interests that
the Court did not recognize as compelling in Roe.9 Second, as the Court
increased its level of scrutiny, it also relied more heavily on the doctrine
of substantive due process 10 to strike down state abortion laws. Substan-
doctor notify a minor's parent or parents withstood the Court's scrutiny. In H.L. v. Matheson, 450
U.S. 398, 400 (1981), the Court upheld a Utah statute requiring doctors to "notify, if possible" the
parents or guardian of a minor seeking an abortion. The Court did not consider the statute's lack of
a judicial-bypass mechanism for mature minors whose interests would be best served by waiving
notice because the plaintiff had made no showing sufficient to give her standing to challenge the law
as a mature minor.
Statutes specifying medical conditions have also withstood judicial review. In Simopoulos v.
Virginia, 462 U.S. 506 (1983), the Court upheld a hospitalization requirement by broadly reading
the statutory definition of "hospital" to include licensed outpatient clinics. In Planned Parenthood
Association of Kansas City v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476 (1983), the Court upheld a second-physician
requirement for third-trimester abortions. Justice Powell based the plurality's opinion on the state's
compelling interest in the potential human life because the state
"may, if it chooses, regulate, and even proscribe, abortion except where it is necessary, in
appropriate medical judgment for the preservation of the life or health of the mother"....
The first physician's primary concern will be the life and health of the woman.... A second
physician, in situations where Missouri permits third-trimester abortions, may be of assist-
ance to the woman's physician in preserving the health and life of the child.
Id. at 482, citing Roe, 410 U.S. at 164-65.
Statutes requiring the woman's consent have been upheld. In Danforth, 428 U.S. at 65-66, Mis-
souri's consent requirement was deemed constitutional because it "insures that the pregnant woman
retains control over the discretion of her consulting physician." Consent statutes for minors, which
typically require the consent of a parent, guardian, or a court, have not found as much success before
the Court. For a discussion of the Court's most significant opinion dealing with consent statutes for
minors, see the discussion of Bellotti II, 462 U.S. 416 (1983), infra notes 87-102 and accompanying
text. Unlike Bellotti II, in which the Court struck down the statute, the Court upheld the consent
statute for minors in Ashcroft. In upholding the statuteJustice Powell relied on the court of appeals'
interpretation which found that Missouri's juvenile court could deny permission to a minor for any
"good cause," but such denial was not permitted "unless it first found - after having received the
required evidence - that the minor was not mature enough to make her own decision." Ashcroft,
462 U.S. at 493. Thus, as so inteipreted, the statute validly furthered the state's interest in protect-
ing immature minors and provided the necessary "judicial alternative" to parental consent. See also
Ashcroft, 462 U.S. at 486-90 (1983)(upheld requiring pathology reports on fetal tissue filed with the
state).
9 The trimester approach only recognizes three compelling state interests: maternal health,
medical standards, and potential life. Roe, 410 U.S. at 154. The framework ignores other state inter-
ests such as promoting childbirth over abortion which is not a compelling state objective within the
framework. Cf. Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977)(upholding an abortion-funding restriction).
Under the current analysis, in which the Court applies strict scrutiny to all regulations, legislation
intended to promote childbirth over abortion cannot withstand the compelling state interest stan-
dard because the trimester framework does not consider this objective compelling.
The Court has recognized the state's interest in promoting childbirth over abortion in Maher.
Id. at 474 (Roe did not limit the state's authority "to make a value judgment favoring childbirth over
abortion and to implement that judgment by allocation of public funds."). That case decided
whether the Constitution requires states to fund both medically-necessary abortions and childbirth
under their Medicare plans. The Court held that the state had no duty to fund both procedures and
was free to subsidize the costs of childbirth and not medically-necessary abortions. Id. at 465-66. In
upholding the law, the Court used the "unduly burdensome" standard. The Court applied a ra-
tional basis standard and concluded that the law was a rational means of accomplishing a valid state
purpose - promoting childbirth over abortion. Id. at 474. The Court did not strictly scrutinize the
law because the funding restrictions did not create an undue burden on the woman's choice. Id.
10 The doctrine of substantive due process has no universally-accepted definition. In general, it
is based on the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. Courts have interpreted the clause
to have certain substantive content because certain rights are so fundamental to our concepts of
ordered liberty that, in some cases, no process at all can deprive an individual of these rights, unless
the state has a compelling state interest and the law is narrowly tailored to affect only that interest.
See generally Roe, 410 U.S. at 155. Justice Harlan, a proponent of an open-ended interpretation of the
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment, stated in Griswold that the Court's proper inquiry is
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tive due process doctrine placed the Court in the ill-suited role of legisla-
"whether this... statute infringes the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because
the enactment violates basic values 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.'... (quoting Palko v. Connecti-
cut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937)(emphasis added)).
The problem with, and the main criticism of, substantive due process doctrine is that the justices
may freely interpret what "values" are "implicit in a concept of ordered liberty" without constitu-
tional restraint. The incorporation controversy illustrates the debate regarding what principle
should guide the justices in interpreting the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. See N.
REDLICH, B. SCHWARTZ &J. ATrANASIO, supra note 4, at 376 ("The Incorporation Controversy histor-
ically involves the determination of which specific protections in the Bill of Rights are guaranteed
against state infringement by the federal government through the Fourteenth Amendment."). Jus-
tice Harlan espoused the view, argued first by Justice Frankfurter, see Adamson v. California, 332
U.S. 46 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., concurring), that "the first section of the Fourteenth Amendment was
meant neither to incorporate, nor to be limited to, the specific guarantees of the first eight Amend-
ments." Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 174 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
Justice Harlan elaborated on the process of defining due process of law:
I can see only one method of analysis that has any internal logic. That is to start with the
words "liberty" and "due process of law" and attempt to define them in a way that accords
with American tradition and our system of government.... Through this gradual process,
this Court . . . define[s] "liberty" by isolating freedoms that Americans of the past and of
the present consider more important than any suggested countervailing public
objective....
Id. at 176-77.
Justice Black was the major proponent of total incorporation, arguing that "the language of the
first section of the Fourteenth Amendment... was thought by those responsible for its submission
to the people.., sufficiently explicit to guarantee that thereafter no state could deprive its citizens of
the privileges and protections of the Bill of Rights." Adamson, 332 U.S. at 74 (Black, J., dissenting).
In Duncan, the case that settled the incorporation controversy when the Court adopted the selective
incorporation theory, Justice Black criticized Justice Harlan's approach for the broad-ranging power
it gave justices:
[D]ue process, according to my Brother Harlan, is to be a phrase with no permanent mean-
ing, but one which is found to shift from time to time in accordance with judges' predilec-
tions and understandings of what is best for the country. If due process means this, the
Fourteenth Amendment... might as well have been written that "no person shall be de-
prived of life, liberty or property except by laws that the judges of the United States
Supreme Court shall find to be consistent with the immutable principles of free
government."
391 U.S. at 168.
While the incorporation controversy involved applying Bill of Rights protections against the
states in criminal proceedings, it is instructive on the debate surrounding the use of substantive due
process doctrine. Whether the justices are confined when interpreting "liberty" in the fourteenth
amendment by either the specific language of the Constitution, the structure of the Constitution, or
are free to go beyond the text of the document, the arguments surrounding the debate parallel those
in the incorporation controversy: whether justices should be free to decide issues based on their
personal predilections or whether they must be confined to the language of the Constitution. See
generally N. REDLICH, B. SCHWARTZ &J. ATANASIO, supra note 4, at 489-90 (1989).
An excerpt from Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963), explains some of the criticism of
substantive due process particularly as it pertains to its use in the first third of this century, the
Lochner era:
There was a time when the Due Process Clause was used by this Court to strike down laws
which were thought unreasonable, that is, unwise or incompatible with some particular eco-
nomic or social philosophy. In this manner the Due Process Clause was used, for example,
to nullify laws prescribing maximum hours for work in bakeries, Lochner v. New York, 198
U.S. 45 (1905), outlawing "yellow dog" contracts, Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915),
setting minimum wages for women, Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U.S. 525 (1923), and
fixing the weight of loaves of bread. Jay Burns Baking Co. v. Bryan, 264 U.S. 504 (1924). This
intrusion by the judiciary into the realm of legislative value judgments was strongly ob-
jected to at the time, particularly by Mr. Justice Holmes and Mr. Justice Brandeis. Dissent-
ing from the Court's invalidating a state statute which regulated the resale price of theatre
and other tickets, Mr. Justice Holmes said:
I think the proper course is to recognize that a state legislature can do whatever it sees
fit to do unless it is restrained by some express prohibition in the Constitution of the
United States or of the State, and that Courts should be careful not to extend such
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ture. 11 It also prevented the states from effectively responding to local
constituents' diverse interests and opinions surrounding this compli-
cated issue.
12
The Court's recent decision in Webster v. Reproductive Health Services 13
marks a shift in the Court's abortion jurisprudence. The plurality se-
verely criticized Roe's trimester framework. After Webster, it appears that
a majority of the justices no longer support this aspect of Roe.' 4 Further-
more, in Webster, the plurality retreats from the active role the Court
played in Roe and its progeny by abandoning strict scrutiny and the doc-
trine of substantive due process. This retreat potentially alleviates the
present conflict between the Court and the state legislatures. Webster,
however, does not establish a new standard of review for abortion regu-
lations. The plurality applied a modified rationality standard in uphold-
ing the regulations.' 5 On the other hand, Justice O'Connor, in her
prohibitions beyond their obvious meaning by reading into them conceptions of public
policy that the particular Court may happen to entertain.
And in an earlier case he had emphasized that, "The criterion of constitutionality is not
whether we believe the law to be for the public good."
The doctrine that prevailed in Lochner, Coppage, Adkins, Burns, and like cases - that due
process authorizes courts to hold laws unconstitutional when they believe the legislature
has acted unwisely - has long been discarded. We have returned to the original constitu-
tional proposition that courts do not substitute their social and economic beliefs for the
judgment of legislative bodies, who are elected to pass laws.
Id. at 729-30.
11 See Ely, supra note 1, at 935 n.89 ("[B]ecause the claims involved [in the abortion controversy]
are difficult to evaluate, I would not want to entrust to the judiciary authority to guess about them -
certainly not under the guise of enforcing the Constitution.").
12 The legislature is in a better position than the judiciary to address such issues and resolve
them fairly because of the legislative branch's superior fact-finding capability, its superior public
accountability (by popular election and direct political accessibility), and the superior benefits af-
forded the public and democracy when the open legislative processes function properly. In this
sense, the "legislatures are ultimate guardians of the liberties and welfare of the people in as great a
degree as the courts." Missouri K. & T. Ry. v. May, 194 U.S. 267, 270 (1904) (Holmes, J.), cited in
Maher, 432 U.S. at 479-80. See also M. GLENDON, ABORTION AND DIVORCE IN WESTERN LAw 40 (1987).
13 109 S. Ct. 3040 (1989).
14 Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote the plurality opinion in Webster, joined by Justices White and
Kennedy, in which he criticized and abandoned Roe's trimester framework. Id. 3054-58. In that
section of the plurality opinion, the ChiefJustice stated, with respect to his critique of the Court's
"web of legal rules" in the abortion-regulation area, that "[wie do not think these distinctions are of
any constitutional import in view of our abandonment of the trimester framework." Id. at 3057 n.15.
Justice Scalia, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, believed the plurality's opinion
regarding the viability-testing requirement effectively overruled Roe. He stated that "I think that
should be done, but would do it more explicitly .. " Id. at 3064 (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice
O'Connor's concurring opinion in Webster is the most problematic in terms of its position on Roe and
the Court's proper role in reviewing abortion regulation. It is problematic because of the cautious
way Justice O'Connor avoided finding a conflict between the viability-testing provision and Roe. See
infra note 229-40 and accompanying text regarding her opinion on the viability-testing provision.
She did not indicate that she no longer adheres to the "unduly burdensome" standard, nor did she
extol the trimester framework. See infra notes 153-62 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
"unduly burdensome" standard. See infra notes 51-66 and accompanying text for a description of
the trimester framework. Rather, she stated that "I continue to consider [Roe's trimester framework]
problematic ..... Id. at 3063 (O'Connor, J., concurring). This Note contends that, even though
Justice O'Connor's Webster concurrence did not explicitly support overturning Roe or the trimester
framework, she continues to support her "unduly burdensome" standard, which does not adhere to
the trimester framework. For a discussion of the "unduly burdensome" standard as applied to the
viability-testing provision in Webster, see infra text accompanying notes 229-40.
15 In Webster, it is not clear what standard the plurality applied to Missouri's viability-testing
provision. The plurality stated that "we are satisfied that the requirement of these tests permissibly
furthers the State's interest in protecting potential life .... 109 S. Ct. at 3057 (emphasis added). It
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concurring opinion, continued to apply the "unduly burdensome" stan-
dard which she first articulated in her dissent in City of Akron v. Akron
Center for Reproductive Health.'6 In the future, the Court may choose to
apply one of these standards to abortion regulations. Thus, Webster is a
transition in the Court's abortion jurisprudence from the strict scrutiny
of Roe to a new, more deferential, standard.
This Note argues that the Court should adopt Justice O'Connor's
"unduly burdensome" standard.' 7 Her approach recognizes a woman's
fundamental right to an abortion and thereby maintains constitutional
protection for that right.' 8 Justice O'Connor's approach, however, only
added that "[tihe Missouri testing requirement here is reasonably designed to ensure that abortions are
not performed where the fetus is viable .. " Id. at 3058 (emphasis added). One cannot determine
conclusively whether this standard is a form of rational basis review or a compelling state interest
standard because the plurality did not identify it. One can draw conclusions from the tone of the
plurality opinion and the level of scrutiny it applied. First, the plurality's tone is generally critical of
pre-Webster abortion opinions, which applied heightened scrutiny to most abortion regulations.
We think that the doubt cast upon the Missouri statute by these cases is not so much a flaw
in the statute as it is a reflection of the fact that the rigid trimester analysis of the course of a
pregnancy enunciated in Roe has resulted in subsequent cases like Colautti and Akron making
constitutional law in this area a virtual Procrustean bed.
Id. at 3056.
Roe and its progeny partially created this "Procrustean bed" because they strictly scrutinized
abortion regulations. This analysis under Roe created a "web of legal rules that have become in-
creasingly intricate, resembling a code of regulations rather than a body of constitutional doctrine."
Id. at 3057 & n.15. In light of this criticism the plurality's "permissibly furthers" language would
appear to be closer to a rationality rather than a compelling state interest standard.
Second, the plurality did not strictly scrutinize the viability-testing provision as the Court had
similar previability regulations in earlier abortion opinions. The plurality stated that the testing
provision ran afoul of Roe and Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379 (1979) (Pennsylvania statute regulat-
ing standard of care to be used by physician performing abortion of possibly viable fetus void for
vagueness), and might have violated Akron. Id. at 3056. The fact that the plurality upheld the provi-
sion in light of these prior holdings showed that it was not strictly scrutinizing the viability-testing
provision.
This Note describes the plurality's standard as a modified rationality standard to denote a stan-
dard of review less demanding than the compelling state interest test, yet distinct from the "unduly
burdensome" standard.
16 462 U.S. 416 (1983). The standard applied byJustice O'Connor in her concurring opinion in
Webster, like the plurality's, is unclear. She did not explicitly identify that she was applying the "un-
duly burdensome" standard. A close reading of her opinion, however, reveals that she tests the
viability-testing provision under that standard with one alteration: previability, "a regulation imposed
on a lawful abortion is not unconstitutional unless it unduly burdens the right to seek an abortion."
109 S. Ct. at 3063 (quoting Akron, 462 U.S. at 453) (O'Connor, J., dissenting). One cannot deter-
mine whether the term "previability" applies only to the facts of Webster or whether it altered the
standard. Nonetheless Justice O'Connor does apply the "unduly burdensome" standard to the via-
bility-testing provision. She stated that such tests do "not impose an undue burden on a woman's
abortion decision," id. at 3063 (emphasis added), and that the increased cost associated with the test
was not an undue burden on the woman. Id. This Note argues that Justice O'Connor applied the
"unduly burdensome" standard in Webster.
17 Akron, 462 U.S. at 452-75 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
18 Justice O'Connor's "unduly burdensome" standard recognizes a woman's fundamental right
to choose whether to have an abortion, whereas Justice Rehnquist's approach in his Roe dissent
protects a woman's interest in making the abortion decision within her liberty interest in the four-
teenth amendment.
This Note does not argue that the Court's finding in Roe, that the right to privacy encompasses a
woman's freedom to choose abortion, was wrong. Rather, it argues that the Court's legislative ac-
tion in Roe and its progeny implementing the trimester approach, was wrong. Thus, the Court
should continue to protect the fundamental right to abortion but under the "unduly burdensome"
standard, its traditional fundamental rights analysis. See Akron, 462 U.S. at 453, 462-66 (O'Connor,




requires the Court to strictly scrutinize state abortion regulations that
unduly burden the woman's choice. When state laws do not unduly bur-
den the woman's decision, the Court will apply the rationality standard.19
This standard provides greater deference to state legislatures' decisions,
and relieves them of the burden of fine-tuning all abortion regulations to
meet the Court's highest scrutiny. Consequently, Justice O'Connor's
"unduly burdensome" standard allows states to more freely promote
their legitimate interests identified in Roe and other interests that Roe did
not recognize, while maintaining constitutional protection for a woman's
right to have an abortion against unduly burdensome state regulation.
Part I of this Note traces the constitutional right to privacy from its
inception, in Griswold v. Connecticut,20 through Roe v. Wade, in which the
Court protected a woman's abortion decision under the right to privacy.
It also examines how the Court's initial privacy decisions laid the founda-
tion for the present conflict between the Court and state legislatures.
Part II examines the states' response to Roe, particularly the conflict over
the permissible extent of abortion regulation. Part II focuses on the in-
terplay between state pressure to affect their legitimate interests and the
Court's increasing level of scrutiny. This Part illustrates how state pres-
sure, in part, caused the Court to become increasingly active in the abor-
tion area by heightening its level of judicial scrutiny. Part III examines
the dissenting opinions throughout the Court's abortion decisions and
their different approaches to the abortion issue. By critiquing the vari-
ous dissents, Part III shows the strengths of Justice O'Connor's "unduly
burdensome" approach as a future method of judicial analysis of state
abortion legislation. Part IV discusses the Court's Webster opinion in de-
tail. It highlights instances in which the opinion breaks from the Court's
prior reasoning in its abortion opinions. It. also identifies the standards
of review available as alternatives to Roe's trimester framework. Finally,
Part V concludes that the Court can most effectively relieve the conflict
between itself and state legislatures by adoptingJustice O'Connor's "un-
duly burdensome" standard. This standard abandons the per se strict
scrutiny, which the Court applied in the past, while maintaining constitu-
tional support for the woman's right identified in Roe.
19 See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma, 348 U.S. 483 (1955). The law at issue in
Williamson regulated the eyeglass-manufacturing business. The Court rejected both due process and
equal protection arguments. The opinion illustrates the deferential rationality standard which the
Court applies to most economic regulations:
mhe law need not be in every respect logically consistent with the aims to be constitu-
tional. It is enough that there is an evil at hand for correction, and that it might be thought
that the particular legislative measure was a rational way to correct it. The day is gone when
this Court uses the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to strike down state
laws, regulatory of business and industrial conditions, because they may be unwise, improv-
ident, or out of harmony with a particular school of thought....
Id. at 487.
This Note does not suggest that the Court should apply a rationality standard to all abortion
regulations. The "unduly burdensome" standard defers to the legislative judgment by not strictly
scrutinizing a regulation unless it creates an undue burden on the woman's freedom to choose an
abortion. The excerpt from Williamson simply exemplifies the rationality standard and, in particular,
the greater deference given to legislative judgments under that rationale than under the compelling
state interest standard.
20 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
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I. The Foundation of the Conflict: Griswold v. Connecticut
and Roe v. Wade
The Supreme Court established a constitutional right to privacy in
Griswold v. Connecticut.2 1 Within this right to privacy Roe v. Wade found
protection for a woman's constitutional right to an abortion. The pres-
ent conflict over abortion regulation originated in the creation of the
fundamental right to privacy in Griswold. In Griswold, the majority's con-
stitutional basis for the right to privacy was ambiguous. This ambiguity
led the dissent and others to criticize the Court for reviving the discred-
ited doctrine of substantive due process in reaching its decision.22 This
ambiguity in the privacy right has left the woman's right to abortion diffi-
cult to define. This Part discusses the ambiguous nature of the right to
privacy and the initial warnings from the dissenters in Griswold and Roe
against the dangers of using the doctrine of substantive due process.
A. Griswold, Substantive Due Process, and the Unsteady Foundation
for the Right to Privacy
The constitutional foundation of the right to privacy is tenuous. The
Constitution does not explicitly grant a right to privacy. The Supreme
Court derived it from the "penumbras" of other constitutional rights ex-
plicitly granted. 23 This tenuous foundation has left the privacy right's
legitimacy in question and weakened the basis for a woman's right to
abortion.
24
The Supreme Court established the right to privacy in Griswold v.
Connecticut.25 The Court struck down a birth control statute that re-
21 Some commentators find the roots of the current right to privacy in Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316
U.S. 535 (1942):
The fundamental character of the reproductive decisions was recognized in a watershed
decision, Skinner v. Oklahoma, where the Court invalidated a state statute providing for the
sterilization of persons convicted two or more times of "felonies involving moral turpi-
tude." The Court characterized the right to reproduce as "one of the basic civil rights of
man."
L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTTlONAL LAW 1339 (1988). The Court also stated that "[m]arriage and
procreation are fundamental to the very existence and survival of the race," Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541,
laying the foundation for the subsequent cases of Griswold and Roe. Skinner, however, did not estab-
lish a new fundamental right; it was decided on equal protection grounds. Id. at 541-43.
22 Griswold, 381 U.S. at 507 (Black, J., and Steward, J., dissenting). ForJustices Black and Stew-
art's arguments concerning the use of substantive due process, see infra text accompanying notes 67-
71.
23 See infra notes 27-28 and accompanying text.
24 See infra text accompanying notes 139-62 & 214-19.
25 See also supra note 21 and accompanying text. The right to privacy in Griswold only pertained
to married individuals. 381 U.S. at 481, 485-86. The majority found that the traditional role of
marriage in American society contained a marital right to privacy which the state could not violate
without a "compelling state interest":
In sum, I believe that the right of privacy in the marital relation is fundamental and basic -
a personal right 'retained by the people' within the meaning of the Ninth Amendment.
Connecticut cannot constitutionally abridge this fundamental right, which is protected by
the Fourteenth Amendment from infringement by the State.
Id. at 499 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
Seven years later, in Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972), the Court struck down a statute
prohibiting the distribution of contraceptives to single persons. Id. at 454-55. Eisenstadt was decided
on equal protection grounds. Id. The majority found no justifying state purpose to differentiate
between married and unmarried adults with respect to contraceptives. Id. at 453. The Court's equal
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stricted the use of contraceptives among married couples.26 The Court
acknowledged the absence of any explicit right to privacy in the text of
the Constitution or the Bill of Rights. Instead, it based its decision on a
right to privacy found in the "specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights
[which] have penumbras, formed by emanations from those guarantees
that help give them life and substance." 27 The Court identified five
amendments from which the right to privacy "emanated": the first, third,
fourth, fifth, and ninth.28
protection holding laid the groundwork for future expansion of the privacy right in Roe. In dicta,
Justice Brennan stated that
[i~t is true that in Griswold the right of privacy in question inhered in the marital relation-
ship. Yet the marital couple is not an independent entity with a mind and heart of its own,
but an association of two individuals each of a separate intellectual and emotional makeup.
If the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual, married or single, to
be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a
person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child.
Id.
26 The statute prohibited the use of contraceptives by married and single persons. Only that
portion of the statute prohibiting the use of contraceptives among married couples was before the
Court. The statute also prohibited any person from counselling others to use contraceptives.
Any person who uses any drug, medicinal article or instrument for the purpose of
preventing conception shall be fined not less than fifty dollars or imprisoned not less than
sixty days nor more than one year or be both fined and imprisoned.
Any person who assists, abets, counsels, causes, hires or commands another to commit
any offense may be prosecuted and punished as if he were the principal offender.
381 U.S. at 480. Justice Douglas elaborated on the penumbral rights to privacy that are related to
specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights." See infra note 28. His discussion, however, highlights the
lack of any explicit constitutional guarantee related to personal matters of procreative liberty.
27 381 U.S. at 483.
28 Id. at 484.
Various guarantees [in the Constitution] create zones of privacy. The right of association
contained in the penumbra of the First Amendment is one.... The Third Amendment in
its prohibition against quartering of soldiers "in any house" in time of peace without the
consent of the owner is another facet of that privacy. The Fourth Amendment explicitly
affirms the "right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures." The Fifth Amendment in its Self-Incrimina-
tion Clause enables the citizen to create a zone of privacy which government may not force
him to surrender to his detriment. The Ninth Amendment provides: "The enumeration in
the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others re-
tained by the people.
Id.
Citing the ninth amendment, Justice Goldberg, concurring, began a debate between himself and
Justice Black, dissenting. The ninth amendment is controversial because it is potentially a broad
constitutional basis upon which the Court could expand constitutional protection of personal rights.
Justice Goldberg believed the ninth amendment evidenced the framers' intent that the people retain
fundamental rights not enumerated in the Constitution. "[The Framers did not intend that the first
eight amendments be construed to exhaust the basic fundamental rights which the Constitution
guaranteed to the people." Id. at 490 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
Justice Goldberg deniedJustice Black's assertion that the Court was overstepping the bounds of
the Constitution by using the ninth amendment to identify fundamental personal rights.
Nor do I mean to state that the Ninth Amendment constitutes an independent source of
rights protected from infringement by either the States or the Federal Government.
Rather, the Ninth Amendment shows a belief of the Constitution's authors that fundamen-
tal rights exist that are not expressly enumerated in the first eight amendments and an
intent that the list of rights included there not be deemed exhaustive. ...
Id. at 492.
Justice Black contended that the Court was using the ninth amendment reminiscent to the
Court's substantive due process era in the first third of this century. See supra note 10. Justice Black
argued that the Court was using the ninth amendment to "strike down all state legislation which this
Court thinks violates 'fundamental principles of liberty and justice,' or is contrary to the 'traditions
and collective conscience of our people.'" Id. at 518-19 (Black, J., dissenting). Justice Black argued
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This string of supporting amendments weakened rather than
strengthened the right to privacy's foundation by highlighting the
Court's lack of textual support within the Constitution. Furthermore, the
lack of textual support bolstered the criticism that the majority was reviv-
ing substantive due process doctrine. The dissent argued that the Court
should determine whether the law violated a personal right guaranteed
by the Constitution, 29 rather than judge the "propriety" of the law in
their individual opinions.
Griswold's nontextual foundation left the privacy right open to other
criticisms. Lack of explicit constitutional support for creating and later
expanding the right to privacy left the Court open to claims of illegiti-
mately usurping legislative power.30 Also, other than the doctrine of stare
that using the ninth amendment extends the power of the Court, contradicting the original intent of
the amendment.
The Amendment was passed, not to broaden the powers of this Court or any other depart-
ment of "the General Government," but, as every student of history knows, to assure the
people that the Constitution in all its provisions was intended to limit the Federal Govern-
ment to the powers granted expressly or by necessary implication. If any broad, unlimited
power to hold laws unconstitutional because they offend what this Court conceives to be the
"[collective] conscience of our people" is vested in this Court by the Ninth Amendment, the
Fourteenth Amendment, or any other provision of the Constitution, it was not given by the
Framers, but rather has been bestowed on the Court by the Court.
Id. at 520 (Black, J., dissenting).
29 Justice Black, in dissent, argued that the Court was evaluating the legitimate laws of state
legislatures and replacing their policy choices with those of the justices.
[T]here is no provision of the Constitution which either expressly or impliedly vests power
in this Court to sit as a supervisory agency over acts of duly constituted legislative bodies
and set aside their laws because of the Court's belief that the legislative policies adopted are
unreasonable, unwise, arbitrary, capricious, or irrational.
Id. at 520-21 (Black, J., dissenting). This criticism resembles that which the dissenters in Roe and its
progeny have leveled against the majority, that the Court is replacing the policy choices of state
legislatures in the abortion area with its own. See also infra text accompanying notes 139-62.
30 One line of criticism from the dissenting justices in Roe and its progeny has been that the
policy decisions and the process of formulating abortion regulations is more appropriate for the
state legislatures than the Supreme Court. The plurality in Webster puts faith in the legislatures'
ability to deal with this issue. It stated that
[tihe dissent's suggestion that legislative bodies, in a Nation where more than half of our
population is women, will treat our decision today as an invitation to enact abortion regula-
tion reminiscent of the dark ages not only misreads our views but does scant justice to those
who serve in such bodies and the people who elect them.
109 S. Ct. 3040, 3058 (1989).
Justice Scalia, frustrated with the Court's role in reviewing abortion legislation, stated in his
Webster concurrence:
The outcome of today's case will doubtless be heralded as a triumph ofjudicial statesman-
ship. It is not that, unless it is statesmanlike needlessly to prolong this Court's self-awarded
sovereignty over a field where it has little proper business since the answers to most of the
cruel questions posed are political and not juridical ....
Id. at 3064 (Scalia, J., concurring).
In his Roe dissent, Justice Rehnquist expressed the problem inherent with substantive due pro-
cess. He stated that the Court must consciously weigh competing factors, yet such weighing "is far
more appropriate to a legislative judgment than a judicial one." 410 U.S. 113, 173 (1973)(Rehn-
quist, J., dissenting).
Griswold nor Roe advocate a free-market theory of jurisprudence, in which the justices are not
bound by the text or structure of the Constitution. For a discussion of the arguments for and against
limiting the justices to interpreting the explicit text of the Constitution, see supra note 10. Rather,
Griswold and Roe attempt to tie their holdings to the Constitution: whether to the "penumbras" of
the Bill of Rights, as in Griswold, or in the fourteenth amendment's concept of "liberty," as in Roe.
The problem in Roe and Griswold is that the Court has no explicit constitutional language in
which to base its holdings. Thus, as the Court expands and strengthens such a right, as it did with
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decisis, there was no compelling reason for dissenting justices to uphold
these right to privacy decisions once they comprise a majority; the jus-
tices feel less compelled to uphold prior opinions they believe are not
constitutionally based.3 ' The majority attempted to refute these criti-
cisms: "We do not sit as a super-legislature to determine the wisdom,
need, and propriety of laws that touch economic problems, business af-
fairs, or social conditions."3 2 Yet, this argument that the majority was
acting as a super-legislature, has weakened the right to privacy and, sub-
sequently, the right to choose an abortion.
Critics argue that the doctrine of substantive due process rests upon
the individual justices' concept of just laws, tradition, and fundamental
values in society, rather than upon specific constitutional language.33 As
such, a right based upon the theory of substantive due process will fluc-
tuate with changing justices or shifting social norms. Substantive due
process decisions leave personal rights ambiguous and state legislatures
unable to draft legislation that satisfies judicial scrutiny.3 4
the right to seek an abortion through Roe's progeny, the Court must continually justify the expan-
sion. Without explicit constitutional support, it becomes more difficult for the Court to justify creat-
ing an absolute right. See M. GLENDON, ABORTION AND DIVORCE IN WESTERN LAW 38 (1987) ("[IThe
right to privacy... has become one of the most absolute rights known to the American legal sys-
tem.").
Professor Ely also noted the stringent protection that Roe provided the abortion right: "What is
frightening about Roe is that this super-protected right is not inferable from the language of the
Constitution, the framers' thinking respecting the specific problem in issue, any general value deriva-
ble from the provisions they included, or the nation's governmental structure." Ely, supra note 1, at
935-36. Professor Ely noted that "[tihe problem with Roe is not so much that it bungles the question
it sets itself, but rather that it sets itself a question the Constitution has not made the Court's busi-
ness." Id. at 943.
In contrast to the right to privacy, the right to free speech has explicit constitutional support.
U.S. CONST. amend. I. It also has a history in our nation's traditions as a highly protected constitu-
tional right. Thus, when the Court erects tests to judge state legislation impacting the freedom of
speech, it has little problem showing constitutional and historical support for its actions.
31 The Webster plurality makes clear that stare decisis is little impediment to questioning prior
holdings if the members of the Court feel there is no constitutional support for the holdings. With
respect to the force of the stare deciiis argument, the plurality stated that "[sitare decirds is a cornerstone
of our legal system, but it has less power in constitutional cases, where, save for constitutional
amendments, this Court is the only body able to make needed changes." 109 S. Ct. at 3056.
32 381 U.S. at 482.
33 Justice Rehnquist argued against using substantive due process in his Roe dissent:
As in Lochner and similar cases applying substantive due process standards to economic and
social legislation, the adoption of the compelling state interest standard will inevitably re-
quire this Court to examine the legislative policies and pass on the wisdom of these policies
in the very process of deciding whether a particular interest put forward may or may not be
"compelling."
410 U.S. at 174 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
34 The Court's opinions during its previous era of substantive due process were inconsistent.
The Court reached different results regarding similar economic regulations. See N. REDLICH, B.
SCHWARTZ &J. ATrANASIO, supra note 4, at 418-19 (1989). See also, L. TRIBE, supra note 2 1, at 560-86.
During the Lochner era, the Court used techniques other than substantive due process to invalidate
economic regulations, namely federalism. See, e.g., Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295
U.S. 495 (1935)(wage and price controls); Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918)(child labor
laws); United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936)(Agricultural Adjustment Act); Carter v. Carter Coal
Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936)(Bituminous Coal Conservation Act).
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B. Broadening the Right to Privacy and Judicial Legislation: Roe v. Wade
In Roe, the Court assumed an active role in the abortion issue. Roe v.
Wade expanded the constitutional right to privacy established in Griswold
to include a woman's right to choose an abortion. Roe held that the right
to privacy "is broad enough to encompass a woman's decision whether
or not to terminate her pregnancy." 35  The Court, however, went be-
yond expanding the fundamental right to privacy. It implemented the
trimester framework to restrict states' ability to legislate the issue. The
trimester framework is the first example of judicial legislation by the
Court.
3 6
The trimester framework restricts a state's legislative power regard-
ing abortion. It identifies state interests that the Court considers com-
pelling. It then weighs those interests differently so that a state may
promote a compelling state interest only in specified instances. The re-
sult of the trimester framework is that states can regulate abortions to
differing degrees depending upon the trimester of pregnancy. Further-
more, because personal privacy is a fundamental right,37 the Court em-
phasized that state legislation must further a "compelling state
35 410 U.S. at 153. The Court identified the source of the right to privacy more precisely than it
had in Griswold. The Court specifically found the right to privacy in the fourteenth amendment's
concept of personal liberty.
This right to privacy, whether it be founded in the Fourteenth Amendment's concept of
personal liberty and restriction upon state action, as we feel it is .... is broad enough to
encompass a woman's decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy.
Id. It is interesting to compare the Court's interpretation of "liberty" in the privacy cases with that
of the Lochner era. In the prior era, the Court defined privacy in terms of the right to contract:
The liberty mentioned in [the fourteenth amendment] means not only the right of the citi-
zen to be free from the mere physical restraint of his person, as by incarceration, but the
term is deemed to embrace the right of the citizen to be free in the enjoyment of all his
faculties; to be free to use them in all lawful ways; to live and work where he will; to earn his
livelihood by any lawful calling; to pursue any livelihood or avocation, and for that purpose
to enter into all contracts which may be proper, necessary and essential to his carrying out
to a successful conclusion the purposes above mentioned.
Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578, 589 (1897).
The post-Lochner Court interpreted "liberty" in its modern substantive due process cases in
terms of personal autonomy and autonomy over family matters, such as the education of children,
procreation, and abortion. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)(abortion); Skinner v.
Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (procreation); Pierce v. Society of Sister, 268 U.S. 510 (1925)(guar-
anteed right to send one's children to parochial school); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923)(law
prohibiting teaching of German to public school children unconstitutional). For example, Meyer de-
fined "liberty" as follows:
[T]he term has received much consideration and some of the included things have been
definitely stated. Without doubt, it denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint but
also the right of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the common occupations of
life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up children, to
worship God according to the dictates of his own conscience, and generally to enjoy those
privileges long recognized at common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness
by free men.
262 U.S. at 399.
36 Professor Ely distinguished Lochner and Roe. First, Lochner expressed a rational basis standard
but misapplied it; Roe explicitly treated the right as fundamental and required a compelling state
interest. Ely, supra note 1, at 941. Second, Lochner refuted the legislative judgment by either finding
that the legislative goal was impermissible or "denying the plausibility of the legislature's empirical
judgment that its action would promote that goal." Id. Roe admitted that the state goal of protecting
the fetus was valid and that prohibiting abortions promoted it, but the Court stated that that interest
is not important enough and thereby questioned the legislative balancing. Id. at 942.
37 Roe, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973).
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interest" 38 and be "narrowly drawn" to further only those compelling
interests.3 9 Thus, under Roe, the Court would strike down overly-broad
state legislation that was not narrowly tailored to a compelling state
objective.
40
Within this framework for abortion legislation, the Court identified
three compelling state interests. 41 The Court also recognized that the
woman's right to an abortion is not absolute42 and that the state has le-
gitimate interests in regulating the area.43 First, the state has an interest
in "preserving and protecting the health of the pregnant woman ....
Second, the state may protect the "potentiality of human life" repre-
sented by the fetus. 45  Third, a state has a compelling interest in main-
taining medical standards.
46
The Court balanced these interests by defining at what point each
interest becomes compelling. The state's interest in maternal health be-
comes compelling at "approximately the end of the first trimester."
47
The Court found viability of the fetus to be the point at which the state's
interest in the potential life becomes compelling.48 Thus, under Roe,
state power to regulate abortion varied according to the trimester of




40 The Court recognized that most of the previous state abortion statutes had been struck down
as overly broad.
Those [courts] striking down state laws have generally scrutinized the State's interests in
protecting health and potential life, and have concluded that neither interest justified broad
limitations on the reasons for which a physician and his patient might decide that she
should have an abortion in the early stages of pregnancy.
Id. at 156.
41 Id. at 154.
42 The Court rejected the argument that the state has no right to interfere with the woman's
abortion decision at any stage of the pregnancy. It stated that "appellants and some amid argue that
the woman's right is absolute and that she is entitled to terminate her pregnancy at whatever time, in
whatever way, and for whatever reason she alone chooses. With this we do not agree." Id. at 153.
43 Although the results are divided, most of these courts have agreed that the right to pri-
vacy, however based, is broad enough to cover the abortion decision; that the right, none-
theless, is not absolute and is subject to some limitations; and that at some point the state
interests as to protection of health, medical standards, and prenatal life, become dominant.
We agree with this approach.
Id. at 155.
44 Id. at 162.
45 Id. These three interests are distinct and increase in importance during the pregnancy to the
point of being "compelling" within various trimesters. Id. at 162-63.
46 Id. at 154.
47 The Court elaborated that because abortion was statistically safer than childbirth until the
second trimester, the state interest in maternal health becomes compelling at that point.
With respect to the State's important and legitimate interest in the health of the mother, the
"compelling" point, in the light of present medical knowledge,'is at approximately the end
of the first trimester. This is so because of the now-established medical fact, that until the
end of the first trimester mortality in abortions may be less than mortality in normal
childbirth.
Id. at 163. Thus, as Justice O'Connor points out in her Akron dissent, the point at which the state
may regulate abortion to protect the mother's health will advance further into the pregnancy as
medical technology makes abortions safer through' advanced techniques. See infra note 153.
48 410 U.S. at 163.
49 Id. The Court has not strictly followed this rule. It has upheld abortion regulation reasonably
related to valid state objectives. For example, recording requirements and written consent are per-
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The decision was left to the woman and her physician.50 During the sec-
ond trimester, the state was permitted to regulate the abortion proce-
dure so long as the legislation is "reasonably related" to "the
preservation of maternal health." 5' In the third trimester, or after viabil-
ity, Roe allowed the state to further its interest in the potential life of the
fetus by regulating and even prohibiting abortions except when neces-
sary for "preservation of the life or health of the mother." 52
By separating pregnancy into trimesters, the Court imposed a na-
tional framework for abortion regulation. It displaced individual state
abortion laws that existed prior to Roe.53 State legislation after Roe fo-
cused on regaining this lost power to regulate abortion, instead of on
finding a workable solution to the abortion controversy within the
state.5
4
The trimester framework exhibited the negative effects associated
with substantive due process.5 5 Reliance on substantive due process to
resolve the abortion issue has at least four negative effects: (1) the
Supreme Court must act as a super-legislature for which it is ill-suited;
(2) the states are not allowed to experiment with different legislative re-
sponses to a social problem; (3) the state legislatures cannot fine-tune
their solutions to local opinion; and (4) the Supreme Court violates the
missible regulations in the first trimester. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Dan-
forth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
50 410 U.S. at 163. The Court has continuously protected the privacy of the physician-patient
relationship. In Roe, the Court said that in the context of first trimester abortions
the attending physician, in consultation with his patient, is free to determine, without regu-
lation by the State, that, in his medical judgment, the patient's pregnancy should be termi-
nated. If that decision is reached, the judgment may be effectuated by an abortion free of
interference by the State.
Id.
See also the Court's holdings as to the informed-consent provisions in Akron and Thornburgh, in
which the state specified that certain information the physician had to give the woman, violated Roe
by "wedging" the state's message preferring childbirth over abortion into the private physician-
patient relationship. See infra text accompanying notes 115-17 & 128-32.
51 410 U.S. at 163.
52 "With respect to the State's important and legitimate interest in potential life, the 'compel-
ling' point is at viability." Id. at 163-64.
53 See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
54 Roe differs from Griswold in that Griswold
did not purport to adopt a whole framework, complete with detailed rules and distinctions,
to govern the cases in which the asserted liberty interest would apply. As such it was far
different from the opinion, if not the holding of Roe v. Wade, which sought to establish a
constitutional framework for judging state regulation of abortion during the entire term of
pregnancy.
Webster, 109 S. Ct. 3040, 3058 (1989). Thus, by going beyond establishing the right to abortion, to
attempt to fashion a system to balance the competing interests in the abortion issue "once and for
all," Roe judicially legislated the abortion regulation area, which had been "traditionally subject to
state regulation . I..." d.
For a comparison of the judicially-created tests in the abortion/right to privacy area versus the
first amendment area, see supra note 30. In brief, the distinction between the two areas lies not in
the tests themselves. Rather, in the free speech area, the Court is dealing with one of the most
explicit constitutional guarantees. It thus has textual support for creating elaborate tests that strin-
gently protect that right. In the privacy area, however, where there is no explicit constitutional sup-
port for the right, and the Court becomes uncomfortable with formulating protective tests for the
right.
55 See infra notes 57-72 and accompanying text.
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principles of federalism5 6 and, specifically, the vertical separation of pow-
ers between itself and the state's residuary police power.
The first problem lies in the Supreme Court's inability to act as a
legislature for complex social issues. The Court acknowledged in Roe
that the abortion issue involves many competing views, ideas, and fac-
tors.57 The Court is ill-suited to take account of these competing inter-
56 The American system is based on federalism to keep check on concentrated governmental
power, facilitate participatory self government, and perform experiments in social progress in the
smaller laboratories of state and local government. Perhaps most importantly, federalism guaran-
tees pluralism.
Justice Brandeis described this proposition in a classic statement:
To stay experimentation in things social and economic is a grave responsibility. Denial of
the right to experiment may be fraught with serious consequences to the Nation. It is one
of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous State may, if its citi-
zens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without
risk to the rest of the country. This Court has the power to prevent an experiment. We
may strike down the statute which embodies it on the ground that, in our opinion, the
measure is arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable. But in the exercise of this high power, we
must be ever on our guard, lest we erect our prejudices into legal principles.
New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). LikewiseJustice
Holmes wrote:
There is nothing that I more deprecate than the use of the Fourteenth Amendment beyond
the absolute compulsion of its words to prevent the making of social experiments that an
important part of the community desires, in the insulated chambers afforded by several
States, even though the experiments may seem futile if even noxious to me and to those
whose judgments I most respect.
Traux v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312, 342-44 (1921) (Holmes,J., dissenting). Justice Frankfurter echoed
that concern when he wrote:
The veto power of the Supreme Court over the social-economic legislation of the states,
thus exercised through the due process clause, is the most vulnerable aspect of undue cen-
tralization. It is... the most destructive, becausejudicial nullification on grounds of consti-
tutionality stops experimentation at its source, and bars increase to the fund of social
knowledge by scientific tests of trial and error.... The inclination of a single Justice or two,
the tip of his mind or his fears, may determine the opportunity of a much needed social
experiment to survive, or may frustrate for a long time intelligent attempts to deal with the
social evil.
F. FRANKFURTER, THE PUBLIC AND rrs GOVERNMENT 50, 51 (1930). More recently, in Whalen v. Roe,
429 U.S. 589, 597 (1977), another privacy decision, the Court emphasized that individual states must
"have broad latitude in experimenting with possible solutions to problems of vital local concern."
The Court noted in San Antonio School District v. Rodriquez, 411 U.S. 1, 42-43 (1973):
The ultimate wisdom as to these [issues] is not likely to be divined for all time even by the
scholars who now so earnestly debate [them]. In such circumstances, the judiciary is well
advised to refrain from imposing on the States inflexible constitutional restraints that could
circumscribe or handicap the continued research and experimentation so vital to keeping
even partial solutions to [such] problems and to keep abreast of ever-changing conditions.
In a recent book on the American constitutional system, Professor Elazar wrote:
For the United States it can fairly be said that federalism has been of the utmost importance
in maintaining pluralism. Federalism has worked in both directions at various times: in the
ability of the states to resist federal encroachments and in the ability of the federal govern-
ment to assault state-fostered or sanctioned encroachments on the legitimate pluralism.
What is important about federal arrangements is not a simple matter of power devolved but
the more complex matter of power shared, allowing different avenues of recourse for in-
jured parties or for those who wish to protect themselves against injury.
D. ELAZAR, THE AMERICAN CONsTrrTroNAL TRADITION 51 (1988).
57 Justice Blackmun began his Roe opinion by addressing the abortion issue's complexity.
We forthwith acknowledge our awareness of the sensitive and emotional nature of the abor-
tion controversy, of the vigorous opposing views, even among physicians, and of the deep
and seemingly absolute convictions that the subject inspires. One's philosophy, one's ex-
periences, one's exposure to the raw edges of human existence, one's religious training,
one's attitudes toward human life and family and their values, and the moral standards one
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ests, balance them and formulate a national solution.58 The state
legislatures are the appropriate democratic body to know and respond to
local constituents' values. Substantive due process prevents state legisla-
tures from assuming their proper role as a democratic body and address-
ing social issues that have been traditionally within their police power.59
Second, when the Supreme Court "legislates" for the nation, it ne-
gates the benefit derived from allowing the states to experiment with var-
ious legislative schemes to a particular problem. 60 Throughout its
abortion decisions, the Court has continuously implemented and tailored
new solutions to abortion-related problems.6' These schemes become
the national standard and prevent state legislatures from experimenting
with new and more effective means of addressing these various issues
that are within their police power. The Court's use of substantive due
process deprived the nation of this benefit inherent in our federal
system.6
2
The third problem follows from the second problem. By mandating
a national approach to the abortion issue, the Court has prolonged its
establishes and seeks to observe, are all likely to influence and to color one's thinking and
conclusions about abortion.
In addition, population growth, pollution, poverty, and racial overtones tend to com-
plicate and not to simplify the problem....
410 U.S. at 113, 116 (1973). While this Note does not contend that the Supreme Court should
refrain from dealing with an issue simply because it is complex, it does argue that the Court should
operate within the federal system and not attempt to foreclose state government by fashioning a
national solution.
58 Professor Ely pointed out the problem in having the Court balance competing interests. The
problem with the Court making moral choices between competing interests is that it is not guided by
any constitutional wording or preferences, thus the justices must supply their own moral choices.
Ely, supra note 1, at 927. Professor Ely noted that the Court in Roe did not attempt to support its
decision with the framers' intent or the governmental system contemplated by the Constitution. Id.
at 927-28.
59 As ChiefJustice Rehnquist argued in Roe, "the Court's sweeping invalidation of any restric-
tion on abortion during the first trimester ... and the conscious weighing of competing factors that
the Court's opinion apparently substitutes for the established [rational relationship] test is far more
appropriate to a legislative judgment than to a judicial one. 410 U.S. at 173 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
60 Justice Goldberg, concurring in Griswold, argued that state experimentation is not always ben-
eficial. He believed that certain rights are so fundamental that the Constitution should not allow
them to be abridged in favor of federalism. He stated that:
"While I quite agree with Mr. Justice Brandeis that * * * 'a * * State may * ** serve as a
laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments,' ... I do not believe that this
includes the power to experiment with the fundamental liberties of citizens * * *." The vice
of the dissenters' views is that it would permit such experimentation by the States in the
area of the fundamental personal rights of its citizens. I cannot agree that the Constitution
grants such power either to the States or to the Federal Government.
381 U.S. 479, 496 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring).
61 The Court has modified its approach on the issue of a minor's right to an abortion. In Dan-
forth, the Court struck down a parental-consent statute and required that the minor have the option
to seek judicial approval. 428 U.S. 52, 72-75 (1976). Then, in Bellotti II, 443 U.S. 622, 643 (1979),
the Court further required that the minor have the option of seeking either parental or judicial
approval.
62 A prime example of such judicial legislation is the Court's choice in Roe to break pregnancy
into trimesters. ChiefJustice Rehnquist stated in Roe, that
the decision to break pregnancy into three distinct terms and to outline the permissible
restrictions the State may impose in each one ... partakes more ofjudicial legislation than
it does of a determination of the intent of the drafters of the Fourteenth Amendment.
410 U.S. at 174 (Rehnquist,J., dissenting).
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conflict with the states as well as the abortion controversy in general. 63
There is no national consensus on abortion.6 States and regions of the
country have different values and judgments. 65 Often the spectrum of
opinions on the abortion issue are less divergent within one state than
they are nationally. 66 When the Court mandates a national solution, it
preempts the state legislatures from devising an effective solution that
may resolve the issue locally.
Justices Black and Stewart, in Griswold, and Justice Rehnquist, in Roe,
articulated the fourth problem: the doctrine of substantive due process
violates the principles of federalism. 67 When the Court uses substantive
due process, it preempts the states from legislating in areas that were
traditionally left within a state's police power,68 by acting as a super-leg-
islature to review the "wisdom" and "propriety" of a state's abortion leg-
islation.69 The Court makes legislative judgments that are normally each
state's responsibility. 70 The Court balances competing factors on a par-
ticular issue and decides which shall prevail. This role violates the verti-
63 By mandating a national policy on abortion legislation before a national consensus emerged,
the Court inhibited the process by which consensus arises from pluralism. See Sandalow, Federalism
and Social Change, 43 LAW & CoNTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1980, at 29-36. At the time the Court de-
cided Roe and certainly since then, "a national consensus plainly had not evolved regarding abor-
tion." Id. at 36. If the states are liberated from the stifling abortion privacy doctrine that treats them
as if they are "subordinate governmental agencies subject to societal norms determined at the na-
tional level.... the law might come to reflect a tolerable accommodation of competing views, differ-
ing from state to state in accordance with the differences among their citizens." Id
John Noonan wrote: "Without the courts the [abortion] controversy would have had a very
different, and much smaller, shape." J. NOONAN, A PRIVATE CHOICE, ABORTION IN AMERICAN IN THE
SEVENTIES 3 (1979).
64 A New York Times/CBS News Poll, taken between April 13-16, 1989, asked: Should abortion
be legal as it is now, or legal only in such cases as rape, incest or to save the life of the mother, or
should it not be permitted at all? Forty-nine percent of the people surveyed said that abortion
should be legal as it is now, 39% said that it should be legal only in certain cases, and 9% said that it
should not be permitted at all. N.Y. Times, April 26, 1989, at 13, col. 2. The opinion poll also
showed that a person's response to whether a woman should be able to obtain a legal abortion
varied greatly according to the circumstances of the pregnancy. Eight-seven percent of the people
surveyed favored legal abortions if the woman's health is seriously endangered by the pregnancy.
This percentage of acceptance dropped to 69% if there is a strong chance of serious defect in the
baby. Forty-three percent of those surveyed believed a legal abortion should be available if the
family has a very low income and cannot afford any more children. Forty-two percent favored legal
abortions if the woman is not married and does not want to marry the father, and only 26% favored
abortion if the pregnancy interfered With the woman's work or education. Id. at 1, col. 3.
65 Some states have been more aggressive about their views on abortion. These states have
continuously demonstrated that abortion is a significant public concern by promoting extensive reg-
ulation. See, e.g., Akron (Ohio); Thornburgh (Pennsylvania); Webster (Missouri). Other states have
shown their satisfaction or lack of concern with Roe by not pursuing elaborate regulation since 1973.
New York, for example, had a liberal abortion law before Roe and has not tested the limits of that
opinion.
66 Newsweek estimated the reaction of each state and the District of Columbia to abortion regula-
tion ifRoe did not exist. Twenty-two states would be likely to restrict abortions. Abortions would be
legal in 13 states. In 16 states, there was no clear consensus as to which path the state would follow.
NEWSWEEK, May 1, 1989, at 38.
67 See supra note 56.
68 See supra note 30.
69 See supra note 29.
70 These, policy choices are not subject to judicial review or are, at most, subject to de minimus
review under a rationality standard.
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cal separation of powers between federal and state government, thereby
frustrating the states' attempts at abortion legislation.
7'
II. From Roe to Thornburgh: The Increasing Scrutiny of the Court
Since the Roe decision in 1973, there has been a continuous battle
between the Supreme Court and various state legislatures over the per-
missible extent of state abortion regulation. Many states sought to re-
strict a woman's abortion right by regulating the facilities and procedures
used.72 Sensing that the states were attempting to undermine Roe, 73 the
Court responded by increasing its level of scrutiny in evaluating state
abortion statutes. As a result, many state abortion laws were struck
down. This Part analyzes several of Roe's progeny, in which the Court's
attempts to judicially legislate were even more pronounced. It also illus-
trates the effects of substantive due process analysis in the results of
these cases. 74.
A. Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth: The Court
Applies the "Unduly Burdensome" Standard
Planned Parenthood v. Danforth75 was the first case to reach the Court
after Roe in which a state sought to protect its maternal health and poten-
tial life interests. The Missouri law extensively regulated abortion. It re-
quired written consent of the patient, her spouse, and a parent or
guardian in the case of a minor. 76 Also, it imposed a standard of care for
71 Justice O'Connor, in her Akron dissent, recommended the Court look to the state legislatures
as the appropriate forum for solving the problem. Justice O'Connor stated that
we must keep in mind that when we are concerned with extremely sensitive issues, such as
the one involved here, "the appropriate forum for their resolution in a democracy is the
legislature.... This does not mean that in determining whether a regulation imposes an
"undue burden" on the Roe right we defer to the judgments made by state legislatures.
"The point is, rather, that when we face a complex problem with many hard questions and
few answers we do well to pay careful attention to how the other branches of Government
have addressed the same problem."
462 U.S. 416, 465 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
72 For example, states have imposed licensing requirements on physicians and facilities perform-
ing abortions, hospitalization requirements for abortions after the first trimester, consent provisions
for the woman and/or her parents if she is a minor. E.g., City of Akron v. Akron Center for Repro-
ductive Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 421-25 nn. 2-8 (1983)(quoting from Akron ordinance No. 160-
1978); Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 58-59 (1976)(ordinance at
issue).
73 The majority sensed pressure from the state legislatures in Thornburgh. It stated:
In the years since this Court's decision in Roe, States and municipalities have adopted a
number of measures seemingly designed to prevent a woman, with the advice of her physi-
cian, from exercising her freedom of choice .... The States are not free, under the guise of
protecting maternal health or potential life, to intimidate women into continuing
pregnancies.
476 U.S. 747, 759 (1986).
74 See supra text accompanying notes 56-71.
75 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
76 Id. at 84-89.
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the physician to maintain regarding the fetus 77 and required the physi-
cian to report certain patient information to the state.
78
The Court used the "unduly burdensome" standard as a guide in
applying the trimester approach. It did not strictly scrutinize every as-
pect of the Missouri law. Instead, the Court applied the rational relation-
ship standard to those provisions that would not create a complete
obstacle to the woman's decision. Consequently, the decision upheld
both the patient's written consent provision 79 and the physician's report-
ing requirements80 as reasonably related to promoting the state's mater-
nal health interest.
As to those provisions potentially creating a complete obstacle to the
woman's decision, the Court applied strict scrutiny to determine if the
state statute was justified by a compelling state interest, and was narrowly
drawn to affect that interest. The spousal consent 8 l and parental consent
provisions8 2 each presented a potentially complete obstacle to a woman's
77 The Court struck this provision without determining whether it burdened the woman's deci-
sion because the standard of care applied to all trimesters of pregnancy.
[The provision] does not specify that such care need be taken only after the stage of viability
has been reached. As the provision now reads, it impermissibly requires the physician to
preserve the life and health of the fetus, whatever the stage of pregnancy.
Id. at 33.
78 Sections 10 and I 1 of Missouri Act imposed recordkeeping requirements for health facilities
and physicians concerned with abortions irrespective of the pregnancy stage. Id. at 52. The require-
ment's purpose was to preserve "maternal health and life by adding to the sum of medical knowl-
edge through the compilation of relevant maternal health and life data and to monitor all abortions
performed to assure that they are done only under and in accordance with the provisions of the law."
Id. The Act provided for the confidentiality of records, except that the "records . . . may be in-
spected and health data acquired by local, state, or national public health officials." Id. The records
were to be kept for 7 years. Id. The Act, however, did not specify what exact information doctors
would take from the woman. The Missouri division of health was to draft the forms. Id. at 84-89
(appendix to opinion containing text of House Bill No. 1211).
79 The Court found that this provision was reasonably related to maternal health:
The decision to abort, indeed, is an important, and often a stressful one, and it is desirable
and imperative that it be made with full knowledge of its nature and consequences. The
woman is the one primarily concerned, and her awareness of the decision and its signifi-
cance may be assured, constitutionally, by the State to the extent of requiring her prior
-written consent.
Id. at 67.
80 The Court found no burden on the woman's choice so long as the recording requirements
related to protecting maternal health and provided for her anonymity. The Court deferred to the
Missouri legislature's judgment:
[Wie see no legally significant impact or consequence on the abortion decision or on the
physician-patient relationship. We naturally assume, furthermore, that these recordkeeping
and record-maintaining provisions will be interpreted and enforced by Missouri's Division
of Health in the light of our decision with respect to the Act's provisions, and that, of
course, they will not be utilized in such a way as to accomplish, through the sheer burden of
recordkeeping detail, what we have held to be an otherwise unconstitutional restriction.
Id. at 81.
81 The Court found that "since the State cannot regulate or proscribe abortion during the first
stage, when the physician and his patient make that decision [to terminate the pregnancy], the State
cannot delegate authority to any particular person, even the spouse, to prevent abortion during that
period." Id. at 69.
82 Justice Blackmun found that the parental-consent provision burdened the minor's decision
because "the State does not have the constitutional authority to give a third party an absolute, and
possibly arbitrary, veto over the decision of the physician and his patient to terminate the patient's
pregnancy, regardless of the reason for withholding the consent." Id. at 74.
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decision. 83 The Court held that neither consent provision furthered the
compelling state interest in protecting maternal health.8 4 The state ar-
gued, however, that its interests in promoting unity in the marriage and
parental authority over minor children justified the burden placed on the
woman's abortion decision.8 5 The Court considered neither of these le-
gitimate state interests compelling within the trimester approach, and
therefore, could not justify the consent requirements.
Danforth represented the low point in the Court's use of substantive
due process in its abortion decisions. The Court faithfully applied the
trimester approach without increasing its reliance on substantive due
process by using the "unduly burdensome" standard to guide it in apply-
ing the Roe framework. The Court strictly scrutinized only those regula-
tions that unduly burdened a woman's choice, i.e., presented an
"absolute obstacle[ ] or severe limitation [ ] on the abortion decision."8s6
As a result, the state was able to implement its legitimate goals of fur-
thering maternal health and protecting potential life.
B. Judicial Activism Regarding a Minor's Abortion Decision:
Bellotti v. Baird
8 7
The Court's decisions concerning a minor's abortion decision ex-
hibit a higher level of scrutiny and judicial intervention than do other
areas of its abortion decisions.88 Bellotti v. Baird (Bellotti II) illustrates
83 The Court also struck down the Act's ban on using the saline amniocentesis method after the
first 12 weeks of pregnancy as not reasonably related to preserving maternal health. The Court
strictly scrutinized this regulation because it severely limited the woman's choice.
[T]he outright proscription of [the] saline [amniocentesis method] fails as a reasonable reg-
ulation for the protection of maternal health. It comes into focus, instead, as an unreasona-
ble or arbitrary regulation designed to inhibit, and having the effect of inhibiting, the vast
majority of abortions after the first 12 weeks.
Id. at 79.
84 The state argued that the spousal consent provision protected the "mutuality of decisions
vital to the marriage relationship." Id. at 71. The Court did not see how this provision could serve
such a purpose because "it is difficult to believe that the goal of fostering mutuality and trust in a
marriage, and of strengthening the marital relationship and the marriage institution, will be achieved
by giving the husband a veto power exercisable for any reason whatsoever or for no reason at all."
Id.
The Court came to a similar conclusion regarding the parental-consent provision:
One suggested interest is safeguarding the family unit and parental authority. It is difficult,
however, to conclude that providing a parent with absolute power to overrule a determina-
tion, made by the physician and his minor patient, to terminate the patient's pregnancy will
serve to strengthen the family unit.
Id. at 75.
85 Id. at 71.
86 City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 461 (1983)
(O'Connor, J., dissenting). The Court has applied the "unduly burdensome" standard only to
previability abortion regulations. See infra note 154. This fact, along withJustice O'Connor's prefac-
ing her restatement of the standard in her Webster concurring opinion, see infra notes 236-40 and
accompanying text, raises the issue of whether she has altered the "unduly burdensome" standard
since Akron. Does the standard apply only to statutes that regulate abortion previability? If this were
true, then there would be an amalgam of the "unduly burdensome" standard and Roe's trimester
framework. Viability would remain a critical point in the pregnancy because before it, a regulation
would be tested under the "unduly burdensome" standard. After viability, the third-trimester stan-
dard of Roe would apply, allowing the state to prohibit all abortions except where necessary to save
the life or health of the mother.
87 443 U.S. 622 (1979).
88 See supra notes 56-71 and accompanying text.
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how the doctrine of substantive due process frustrated states' attempts to
satisfy the Court's standard of review. In Belotti II, the Court reviewed a
Massachusetts statute regulating a minor's abortion decision.8 9 Massa-
chusetts had reacted to the Court's prior abortion opinions in drafting its
abortion statute.90 Unlike the statute in Danforth, the Massachusetts' stat-
ute did not provide a minor's parents with an absolute veto over her de-
cision. 91 Rather, it required a minor seek the consent of both parents
and, if either one or both refused, then the state allowed her to seek
judicial approval.
Bellotti II came before the Court, for the first time, in 1976.92 The
Supreme Court remanded the case to the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts for interpretation. 93 The finding upon remand was that a
minor must notify her parents in every case, even when she seeks judicial
approval.94 The Court held that such consultation unduly burdened the
minor's right to seek an abortion 95 and that "'there are parents who
would obstruct, and perhaps altogether prevent, the minor's right to go
to court.' "96
This holding supplanted Massachusetts' policy choice that a minor
should consult with her parents before having an abortion. It reweighed
the competing interests that arise in a minor's abortion decision. The
Court proposed its own legislative scheme to deal with a minor's deci-
sion, reflecting the Court's belief that the minor's freedom to choose
abortion outweighed the benefit that Massachusetts believed came from
having her first consult with her parents.97
The Court enumerated the components of a valid statute: "[I]f the
State decides to require a pregnant minor to obtain one or both parents'
consent to an abortion, it also must provide an alternative procedure
whereby authorization for the abortion can be obtained." 98 The Court
supplied the state with the factors it must look to when deciding whether
to authorize a minor's abortion. The Court stated that the state must
authorize a minor's abortion if she shows "(1) that she is mature enough
and well enough informed to make her abortion decision, in consultation
89 The Massachusetts statute provided:
If the mother is less than eighteen years of age and has not married, the consent of both the
mother and her parents [to an abortion to be performed on the mother] is required. If one
or both of the mother's parents refuse such consent, consent may be obtained by order of a
judge of the superior court for good cause shown, after such hearing as he deems
necessary.
443 U.S. at 625.
90 Massachusetts passed their parental-consent statute after the Supreme Court's Danforth
opinion.
91 See supra notes 81-85 and accompanying text.
92 Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U.S. 132 (1976) [hereinafter Bellotti 1].
93 Bellotti H1, 443 U.S. at 628-29.
94 "As a general rule, a minor who desires an abortion may not obtain judicial consent without
first seeking both parents' consent." Id. at 630. Further, "[e]ven if thejudge.., finds 'that the minor
is capable of making, and has made, an informed and reasonable decision to have an abortion,' he is
entitled to withhold consent' in circumstances where he determines that the best interests of the
minor will not be served by an abortion." Id. at 630.
95 Id. at 647.
96 Id.
97 See supra notes 12 & 30.
98 443 U.S. at 643.
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with her physician, independently of her parents' wishes; or (2) that even
if she is not able to make this decision independently, the desired abor-
tion would be in her best interests." 99
Bellotti II also illustrated the Court's increasing scrutiny of state
abortion laws after Roe. In Bellotti II, the Court lowered the threshold at
which state legislation unduly burdens the woman's decision whether to
have an abortion. The Court found that requiring a minor to first con-
sult with her parents unduly burdened her decision, even though the
Massachusetts regulation did not inhibit a woman's decision to the extent
to which the Court had found an undue burden in prior opinions.' 00 As
compared to Danforth, in which the undue burden consisted of a possible,
complete veto of the woman's decision,10 1 the Massachusetts statute did
not present the possibility of a veto over the minor's decision. She re-
mained free to seek judicial approval if her parents refused to give their
consent. 10 2 The Court's increasing standard regarding the permissible
level of state interference hindered the state's attempt at legislating its
interests in the health of minors.
Bellotti II shows the Court's willingness to frustrate federalism princi-
ples by fashioning a national solution to the abortion question. Assum-
ing the Court was correct in striking down the statute as unduly
burdensome, it was improper for the Court to suggest its own legislative
model. The Court justifiably may use the compelling state interest stan-
dard to strike down a state regulation that unduly burdens a woman's
decision. The Court should not, however, provide its own legislative al-
ternative and preempt the states from formulating their own solutions.
C. Discarding the "Unduly Burdensome" Standard: Akron and Thornburgh
In City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health,10 3 the Court
continued to abandon the "unduly burdensome" standard, which it ap-
plied in Danforth, and began to apply strict scrutiny to all abortion regula-
tions. As the Court felt increased pressure from state legislative attempts
to regulate abortion, it turned its inquiry to the legislature's intent in
passing the abortion regulation. The Court began searching for an an-
tiabortion intent behind a statute instead of testing the law against the
"unduly burdensome" standard. This method intruded into the state's
legislative process and further frustrated state attempts to legislate their
interests in maternal health and potential life. The Court's increasingly
active and demanding role paralleled that which the Griswold majority had
rejected and which its dissenters, and those of Roe, had warned against:
99 Id. at 643-44.
100 Cf. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976) (potential veto power in the hands of a third party created an
undue burden).
101 See supra notes 81-85 and accompanying text.
102 Even though the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court found that a judge could refuse to
give a mature minor his consent if he believed it was in her best interests, Bellotti 11, 443 U.S. at 630,
the Court could have simply struck down that interpretation of the statute. The Court did not need
to decide that the state could not require a minor to first consult with her parents. It could have
deferred to the state's determination that it would be in the best interests of a minor to consult with
her parents first.
103 462 U.S. 416 (1983).
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"We do not sit as a super-legislature to determine the wisdom, need, and
propriety of laws that touch . . . social conditions." 10 4 From Akron to
Thornburgh, the Court, did not restrain itself to striking down only those
laws that severely impaired a woman's decision; rather, it became the na-
tion's legislature, reviewing the abortion legislation of the various states.
1. City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health
In Akron, the Court reviewed five sections of an Ohio ordinance re-
quiring that 1) all abortions after the first trimester be performed in a
hospital; 2) parents be notified and consent to their unmarried daugh-
ter's abortion; 10 5 3) the physician give the woman specific information to
insure her informed consent; 0 6 4) the patient wait twenty-four hours af-
ter giving her consent to have the abortion; and 5) the fetal remains be
"disposed of in a humane and sanitary manner."'
0 7
In Akron, the Court changed the trimester framework, further shift-
ing the standard and making state compliance more difficult. The Court
added a new dimension to the trimester framework by requiring that
states tailor their abortion legislation to meet "accepted medical stan-
dards."' 08 The Court stated that "the State is obligated to make a rea-
sonable effort to limit the effect of its regulations to the period in the
trimester during which its health interests will be furthered."' 0 9  This
requirement fragmented the rigid trimester approach because abortion
techniques did not parallel the trimesters of pregnancy. Thus, states
could no longer rely on the brightlines established by Roe and its prog-
eny in formulating abortion legislation.
The Court utilized this new obligation to invalidate Ohio's hospitali-
zation requirement. At the time of the Akron opinion, accepted medical
standards recommended hospitalization for only the second half of the
second trimester.110 The state's hospitalization requirement applied to
the full second trimester. The state had not tailored its regulation to the
104 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482 (1965).
105 The Court had discussed the constitutionality of parental notification requirements in Bellotti
II. 443 U.S. 622 (1979). The Court reviewed the ordinance's two-parent notification provision, id.
at 649, and stated that it was not unconstitutional. However, the Court qualified its statement by
illustrating the circumstances it envisioned: "At least when the parents are together and the preg-
nant minor is living at home, both father and mother have an interest - one normally supportive -
in helping to determine the course that is in the best interest of a daughter." Id.
106 For the specific information the statute required a doctor to give the woman, see Akron, 462
U.S. at 423 n.5.
107 Id. at 421-24 & nn. 2-7.
108 "The State's discretion to regulate on this basis does not, however, permit it to adopt abor-
tion regulations that depart from accepted medical standards." Id. at 431. Justice O'Connor argued
that the trimester approach was no longer viable because advancing technology revealed that the
approach could not deal with new technology. See infra note 153 (Justice O'Connor describes the
trimester framework as on a collision course with itself).
109 462 U.S. at 434.
110 "Mhe ACOG [the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists] no longer suggests
that all second-trimester abortions be performed in a hospital" Id. at 437. The Court acknowledged
that the states ability to legislate within the trimester approach fluctuated with the advances in medi-
cal technology, pushing forward the point when abortions become more dangerous than childbirth.
This position had strong support at the time of Roe v. Wade, as hospitalization for second-
trimester abortions was recommended by the American Public Health Association. . ..
Since then, however, the safety of second-trimester abortions has increased dramatically.
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specific period within the second trimester for which "accepted medical
standards" recommended hospitalization. By qualifying the brightlines
of the trimester framework with an "accepted medical standards" re-
quirement, the Court frustrated the state's attempt to comply with Roe;
the state had relied on earlier decisions treating the trimesters as indivisi-
ble units and not flexible guidelines that vary with "accepted medical
standards.""'
Akron also indicated the Court's willingness to lower its definition of
undue burden and, therefore, the point at which it strictly scrutinized
abortion regulation. In Danforth, the Court strictly scrutinized only those
regulations presenting a potential "absolute obstacle" to the woman's
decision." 12 In Akron, however, the Court strictly scrutinized the hospi-
talization requirement after determining that it presented a "significant
obstacle in the path of women seeking an abortion." 113 This provision,
however, did not prevent the woman from exercising her choice as did
the regulation in Danforth. 1
4
Akron illustrates the Court's increasing use of substantive due pro-
cess analysis to strike down "unwise" regulations. The Court held the
informed consent provisions unconstitutional because the state required
a physician and not another qualified person to give the patient specified
information."15 The Court stated that "we believe it is unnecessary for a
State to insist that only a physician is competent to provide the informa-
The principal reason is that the D & E [dilation and evacuation] procedure is now widely
and successfully used for second-trimester abortions.
Id. at 435-36.
Justice O'Connor addressed this weakness of the trimester approach in her Akron dissent:
The Roe framework is inherently tied to the state of medical technology that exists when-
ever particular litigation ensues. Although legislatures are better suited to make the neces-
sary factual judgments in this area, the Court's framework forces legislatures, as a matter of
constitutional law, to speculate about what constitutes "accepted medical practice" at any
given time. Without the necessary expertise or ability, courts must then pretend to act as
science review boards and examine those legislative judgments.
Id. at 458 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
Il1 The fact that the Court has had to adjust the trimester framework suggests that the Court is
ill-suited at determining a national solution. The Court is inherently slower at responding to medi-
cal changes because it must necessarily wait for a case dealing with the appropriate issue. State
legislatures are free to fine-tune their abortion legislation at any time in response to medical ad-
vances. This fact gives legislatures the ability to adopt better responses to the changing issues in the
abortion context. See also supra note 56.
112 See supra notes 73-84 and accompanying text.
113 462 U.S. at 434. The Court found that the hospitalization requirement added to the costs of
abortions, in time and money. Id. at 435. Danforth, however, found Missouri's hospitalization re-
quirement unduly burdensome because it "inhibit[ed] the vast majority of abortions after the first 12
weeks." 428 U.S. at 79 (emphasis added). Even as to hospitalization requirements, the Court's
definition of an undue burden lowered from Danforth to Akron.
114 See supra notes 81-85 and accompanying text.
115 The four sections that the Court refused to sever and uphold required
that the patient be informed by the attending physician of the fact that she is pregnant....
the gestational age of the fetus, . . . the availability of information on birth control and
adoption.... and the availability of assistance during pregnancy and after childbirth ....
This information, to the extent it is accurate, certainly is not objectionable, and probably is
routinely made available to the patient. We are not persuaded, however, to sever these
provisions from the remainder of [the provision]. They require that all of the information
be given orally by the attending physician when much, if not all of it, could be given by a
qualified person assisting the physician.
462 U.S. at 445 n.37.
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tion and counseling relevant to informed consent."' 16 Likewise, as to the
twenty-four hour waiting period, the Court concluded that "we [are not]
convinced that the State's legitimate concern that the woman's decision be
informed is reasonably served by requiring a 24-hour delay .... ,"117 Yet,
neither of these provisions presented a potential, complete obstacle or
severe limitation to a woman's decision. Therefore, under the Court's
earlier decisions, the Court should not have subjected the provision to
strict scrutiny. Rather, the Court should have applied a rationality stan-
dard. If the Court had done so, it would have found that the regulations
were rationally related to protecting maternal health. Instead, the Court
used the doctrine of substantive due process and strict scrutiny to strike
down the regulations as "unnecessary."
2. Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists
Thornburgh I'8 is the pinnacle of the Court's intervention into the
states' sphere of legislative authority. The Court continued to use the
doctrine of substantive due process, evaluating the "wisdom" and "pro-
priety" of state laws instead of determining whether the regulation im-
posed an undue burden on the woman's decision.
Thornburgh also illustrates the intensity of the conflict between the
Court and the state legislatures. The Court explicitly relied on the find-
ing of an antiabortion intent as a basis to strike down the law. The Court
began its opinion with a verbal attack on the Pennsylvania legislature,
admonishing it for what the Court believed to be the state's intention
behind the Act: "The States are not free, under the guise of protecting
maternal health or potential life, to intimidhte women into continuing
pregnancies."' 19 The Court felt that the Pennsylvania legislature's intent
was not to legitimately regulate abortion, but rather "to deter a woman
from making a decision that, with her physician, is hers tW make."' 120 The
Court relied, in part, upon this finding of an antiabortion intent to invoke
strict scrutiny, instead of applying the "unduly burdensome" standard.
The Court strictly scrutinized two regulations intended to promote
the potential life of the fetus even though the provisions did not consti-
tute an undue burden under the Court's prior holdings nor violate the
trimester framework. One required the physician to use the same degree
of care with a viable fetus that he would use to preserve the life of an
unborn child not meant to be aborted, unless it" 'would present a signif-
icantly greater medical risk to the life or health of the pregnant wo-
man.' "121 The second provision required that a second physician be
present during the abortion of a possibly viable fetus to " 'take control of
116 Id. (emphasis added).
117 Id. at 450 (emphasis added). The state argued that the 24-hour waiting period "furthered [its]
interest in ensuring 'that a woman's abortion decision is made after careful consideration of all the
facts applicable to her particular situation.' " Id. at 449.
118 476 U.S. 747 (1986).
119 Id. at 759.
120 Id.
121 Id. at 768.
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the child and ... provide immediate care to preserve the child's life and
health.' "122
The Court struck down the standard-of-care provision, finding that
it required the woman to accept a greater health risk to save the viable
fetus. 123 The Court, however, ignored the compelling state interest in
protecting potential life that exists after viability. 124 Justice White ar-
gued, in his dissent, that Roe recognized such a "tradeoff between mater-
nal health and protection of the fetus, for it [Roe] plainly permits the
State to forbid a postviability abortion even when such an abortion may
be statistically safer than carrying the pregnancy to term, provided that
the pregnancy is not medically necessary."' 25 The Court also struck
down the second-physician requirement for failing to provide a medical-
emergency exception when the woman's health or life is endangered and
a second physician is unavailable.126 The Court, however, ignored a stat-
utory provision providing a complete defense for a physician charged
with violating the second-physician requirement if he or she believed
"that the abortion was necessary to preserve maternal health or life."' 27
The Court also struck down provisions intended to protect maternal
health. The first provision specified that information be given to the wo-
man to insure her informed consent. 128 Like a similar provision in Ak-
ron,129 Pennsylvania's Act informed the woman of public agencies that
could assist her in carrying her child to term, described the fetal develop-
ment, and the risks to her health involved in abortion.' 30 The Court
found that it was not intended to further maternal health, but rather was
an attempt "to wedge the Commonwealth's message discouraging abor-
tion into the privacy of the informed-consent dialogue between the wo-
man and her physician."''
The Court's review of the informed-consent provision illustrates its
active role in passing on the "wisdom" of state abortion legislation. The
Court unnecessarily reviewed the informed-consent provision as one
designed to inhibit abortions. The Court could have reviewed the provi-
sion as one intended to promote the woman's health by providing her
122 Id. at 769-70.
123 Id. at 768-69. The Court agreed with the court of appeals "that § 3210(b) was unconstitu-
tional because it required a 'trade-off' between the woman's health and fetal survival, and failed to
require that maternal health be the physician's paramount consideration." It would not allow such a
' "trade-off' between the woman's health and additional percentage points of fetal survival." Id.
124 See infra text accompanying notes 228-40.
125 476 U.S. at 809-10 (White, J., dissenting).
126 Id. at 771. The majority inferred a sinister intent in the Pennsylvania legislature's statute.
It is clear that the Pennsylvania Legislature knows how to provide a medical-emergency
exception when it chooses to do so.... We necessarily concluded that the legislature's
failure to provide a medical-emergency exception in § 3210(c) was intentional. All factors
are here for chilling the performance of a late abortion, which more than one performed at
an earlier date, perhaps tends to be under emergency conditions.
Id.
127 Id. at 811 (White, J., dissenting).
128 See American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists v. Thornburgh, 737 F.2d 283 (3d
Cir. 1984)(appendix).
129 See supra note 115.
130 Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 759-62.
131 Id. at 762.
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with full knowledge of her options and allowing her to make her own
decision. If her choice is to forgo the abortion in favor of childbirth, then
the provision has not violated Roe. Roe held that the woman has the free-
dom to choose whether to have an abortion. Roe did not require that
states favor abortion over childbirth.13 2 Thus, by skewing the provision's
intended effect to be that of inhibiting abortions - instead of providing
for the woman's informed consent - the Court prevented the state from
furthering its interest in women's health.
The Court also struck down the reporting requirements of the
law.133 The Act required reporting the following information: the name
of the physician; the basis for the determination of a nonviable fetus after
the first trimester; the woman's age, race, marital status, and number of
previous pregnancies; and the method of payment.' 3 4 The Court found
that these requirements were not intended to further the state's interest
in maternal health.' 3 5 Instead, the Court found that exposure of the wo-
man's identity was the legislature's main purpose.'3 6 As such, the provi-
sion was invalid for not advancing a legitimate state purpose.'3 7 The
Court, by finding an unstated purpose behind the reporting require-
ments, invalidated the regulation upon that basis. Because the require-
ment itself provided anonymity for the woman and her physician,
13 8
however, it is unlikely that identification was the state's intent. If the
Court had applied the "unduly burdensome" standard, it would have de-
termined whether the requirement imposed an undue burden on the wo-
man's decision. The reporting requirement did not present an absolute
obstacle or severe limitation to the woman's choice and would have been
upheld as a rational means of promoting maternal health and maintain-
ing medical standards.
III. The Conflict -Fosters Strong Dissents
The unusually active role played by the Supreme Court has caused
not only public controversy, but controversy on the Court. Many of the
justices have disagreed with the Court's abortion decisions. The dissents
have grown stronger and more persuasive as the Court battled with the
state legislatures from Roe in 1973 to Thornburgh in 1986.' 39 The dissents
132 Justice White stated
[t]hat the result of the provision of information may be that some women will forgo abor-
tions by no means suggests that providing the information is unconstitutional, for the os-
tensible objective of Roe v. Wade is not maximizing the number of abortions, but maximizing
choice.
Id. at 801 (White, J., dissenting).
133 Id. at 767-68.
134 Id. at 765.
135 Id. at 765-66.
136 "Although the statute does not specifically require the reporting of the woman's name, the
amount of information about her and the circumstances under which she had an abortion are so
detailed that identification is likely." Id. at 766-67.
137 Id. 767-68.
138 See supra note 128.
139 Roe v. Wade was decided in 1973 by a 7-2 vote. In 1976 the vote was 6-3 in Danforth. Thorn-
burgh was decided in 1986 by a 5-4 vote. In 1987 the Court was split evenly, 4-4, in Hartigan v.
Zbaraz, 484 U.S. 171 (1987)(24-hour waiting period unconstitutional but severable and parental-
notification provision enjoined). Moreover, within the Court there was growing concern about ap-
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were of two forms. One line of argument, first expressed by ChiefJustice
Rehnquist in Roe and the dissenters in Griswold, took issue with the
Court's role.1 40 The other argument, by Justice O'Connor in Akron, ac-
knowledged Justice Rehnquist's argument but went further to urge a new
abortion jurisprudence for the Court. 41
A. ChiefJustice Rehnquist: The Court Returns to its
Ill-Suited Role as Legislator
ChiefJustice Rehnquist's argument is based on his criticism, and the
Court's historical aversion to the doctrine of substantive due process as a
basis to strike down state laws.142 ChiefJustice Rehnquist views the doc-
trine of substantive due process and the compelling state interest stan-
dard as inappropriate methods of judicial review in the abortion
context. 43 In Roe, Chief Justice Rehnquist found the woman's right to
abortion in the fourteenth amendment's concept of personal "lib-
erty."' 44 As such, that interest is subject to the state's regulatory power
over social and economic matters within the limits of due process. The
appropriate test, therefore, to determine if the woman's "liberty" has
been violated, is "whether or not a law, such as that challenged, has a
rational relation to a valid state objective."' 45 Chief Justice Rehnquist
would not test any state abortion regulation under the strict scrutiny of
the compelling state interest standard. As a result, the woman's freedom
of choice could be completely frustrated so long as the regulation has a
rational relation to a valid state objective.1
46
plying the abortion doctrine expansively. For example, Justice Powell broke with Justice Blackmun
and voted not to expand the abortion privacy doctrine in all five of the prior funding cases (Maher,
Beal, Poelker, McRae, and Zbaraz). He wrote the opinion for the Court in two cases (Maher and Beal).
Justice Stewart filed separate concurring opinions in Roe and Bolton, 410 U.S. 113, 167 (1973), and
Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 89 (1976), and broke with Justice Blackmun in the last three major abortion
cases he heard, writing the opinion for the Court in McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 300 (1980), and Zbaraz,
448 U.S. 358, 360 (1980). See also H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398, 413 (1981). In Thornburgh, Chief
Justice Burger, who had voted with the Roe majority, strongly dissented against what he viewed as an
unjustified and excessive extension of the principles of Roe, and called for reexamining Roe. 476 U.S.
747, 785 (1986) (Burger, CJ., dissenting). Justice O'Connor's incisive dissenting opinions in Ahron,
462 U.S. 416, 452 (1983), and Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 814, also enhanced the credibility and serious-
ness of the criticisms of Roe.
140 See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 172 (Rehnquist,J., dissenting). See also supra text accompany-
ing notes 56-71.
141 See Akron, 462 U.S. 416 (1983) (O'Connor, J., dissenting). See also infra text accompanying
notes 153-62.
142 See supra notes 10 & 147. First, Justice Rehnquist questioned whether the right to privacy is
the issue in abortion. Roe, 410 U.S. at 172 (Rehnquist,J., dissenting). He, instead, based his argu-
ment on the term "liberty" within the fourteenth amendment and the "claim of a person to be free
from unwanted state regulation of consensual transactions .. " Id. Thus, under Chief Justice
Rehnquist's argument there is no fundamental right to abortion, but rather, a person's more general
right of personal liberty.
143 See infra text accompanying notes 147-51.
144 Roe, 410 U.S. at 172 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
145 Id. at 173.
146 ChiefJustice Rehnquist would uphold the Texas statute making abortion illegal except to save
the woman's life. This approach is incompatible with a position that continues to recognize a wo-
man's constitutional right to choose abortion. Id. at 172 (Rehnquist,J., dissenting) ("I would reach a
conclusion opposite to that reached by the Court ... ").
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ChiefJustice Rehnquist also viewed Roe as a resurgence of substan-
tive due process doctrine, a theory discredited by the Court in the
1930s. 147 ChiefJustice Rehnquist stressed the problems that using sub-
stantive due process entails. The doctrine involves "the conscious
weighing of competing factors that the Court[] . . . substitutes for the
established [rational relationship] test . ... 148 ChiefJustice Rehnquist
argued that substantive due process invariably compels the Court to ex-
amine the "wisdom" of state legislation in determining whether an inter-
est is compelling. 149 Chief Justice Rehnquist urged that such weighing
"is far more appropriate to a legislative judgment than a judicial one."'150
The doctrine thus puts the Court in the position of super-legislature. 15'
ChiefJustice Rehnquist's argument does not present a workable so-
lution to the present abortion conflict between the Court and the states.
The initial decision in Roe, finding that a woman's right to choose an
abortion is within her privacy right, was within the Court's authority to
protect and interpret constitutional guarantees. 152 The conflict arose, in
part, because of the Court's affinity to step beyond protecting and inter-
preting constitutional rights. It began formulating policy and legislative
schemes. The Court expanded its role beyond protecting the woman's
147 Before 1968, the Court previously used substantive due process doctrine in the first third of
the twentieth century. This era is named after its most infamous case, Lochner v. New York. 198
U.S. 45 (1905). In Lochner, the Court struck down a New York law that limited the number of hours
bakery employees could work per week. The Court relied upon a right to freely contract one's labor.
The Court's activity became particularly controversial during President Roosevelt's New Deal legis-
lation in the 1930s. The Court struck down New Deal legislation as violating the due process clause
and one's personal "liberty" to contract. The Court grounded these opinions by substantively read-
ing a right to contract into the fourteenth amendment. Many observers contend that the Court was
trying to implement its theory of laissezfaire economics in the face of Roosevelt's New Deal legisla-
tion. L. TRIBE, supra note 21, at 568.
After tremendous pressure from President Roosevelt in the infamous "court-packing crisis," the
Court changed its stance and upheld the New Deal legislation. See United States v. Carolene Prods.
Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938). Since this era, the Court generally defers to the legislature's
social and economicjudgments. See supra note 19. The Court looks back to that period ofjudicial
activism with disfavor. Justice White, dissenting in Thornburgh, 476 U.S. 747 (1986), criticized Roe by
comparing it to the Lochner era.
[T]he hallmark of a correct decision of constitutional law is that it rests on principles se-
lected by the people through their Constitution, and not merely on the personal philoso-
phies, be they libertarian or authoritarian, of the judges of the majority. While
constitutional adjudication involves judgments of value, it remains the case that some val-
ues are indeed "extraconstitutional," in that they have no roots in the Constitution that the
people have chosen. The Court's decision in Lochner v. New York was wrong because it
rested on the Court's belief that the liberty to engage in a trade or occupation without
governmental regulation was somehow fundamental - an assessment of value that was
unsupported by the Constitution. I believe that Roe v. Wade - and today's decision as well
- rests on similarly extraconstitutional assessments of the value of the liberty to choose an
abortion....
Id. at 797 (citations omitted). See generally, N. REDLICH, B. SCHWARTZ &J. A'rANASIO, supra note 4, at
415-16, 418-19.
148 410 U.S. at 173 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
149 Id. at 174.
150 Id. at 173.
151 Chief Justice Rehnquist argued, for example, that "[tihe decision here to break pregnancy
into three distinct terms ... partakes more ofjudicial legislation than it does of a determination of
intent of the drafters of the Fourteenth Amendment." Id.
152 Compare Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), with Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
For ChiefJustice Rehnquist's comparison of Griswold and Roe in his plurality opinion in Webster, see
infra notes 222-27 and accompanying text.
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right to abortion and became a super-legislature that reviewed the na-
tion's abortion laws. The Court does not need to overturn Roe, as would
Chief Justice Rehnquist, to alleviate the present conflict. Rather, the
Court should return to its role as a protector and interpreter of constitu-
tional guarantees and refrain from legislative activity.
B. Justice O'Connor: The "Unduly Burdensome" Standard
Justice O'Connor's Akron dissent introduced an alternative frame-
work for the Court to review abortion regulation. 153 Justice O'Connor
did not argue that a woman's right to an abortion is not fundamental.
Rather, she advocated using the Court's traditional fundamental rights
analysis,154 which she believed the majority has abandoned in Roe's
progeny.
153 Justice O'Connor criticized the Court's analysis in its abortion decisions since Roe. Justice
O'Connor argued that
[t]he Roe framework... is clearly on a collision course with itself. As the medical risks of
various abortion procedures decrease, the point at which the State may regulate for reasons
of maternal health is moved further forward to actual childbirth. As medical science be-
comes better able to provide for the separate existence of the fetus, the point of viability is
moved further back toward conception.
Akron, 462 U.S. at 458 (1983) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
She believed the Court had placed itself in the position of medical review board for the nation.
Id. In Akron, the Court stated that a state's abortion legislation may not deviate from accepted
medical practice. Id. at 455-56. Therefore, the Court must ascertain the level of medical technology
in reviewing abortion cases to determine if the regulations meet the corresponding level of technol-
ogy. Roe's trimester framework cannot withstand medical advances if it is tied to the changes in
medical technology. Justice O'Connor explains that, under Roe, "[jiust as improvements in medical
technology inevitably will move forward the point at which the State may regulate for reasons of
maternal health, different technological improvements will move backward the point of viability at
which the State may proscribe abortions except when necessary to preserve the life and health of the
mother." Id. at 456.
154 The Court adheres to the undue burden analysis outside the abortion-regulation context.
The Court applies strict scrutiny only when the state statute substantially impacts the fundamental
right. The Court, therefore, defers to the state's policy choices and will not reevaluate the "wisdom"
or "propriety" of the legislation. In privacy matters not related to abortion, "[s]tate legislation
which has some effect on individual liberty or privacy may not be held unconstitutional simply be-
cause a court finds it unnecessary, in whole or in part." Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 597 (1977)(pa-
tient-identification requirements in New York Controlled Substances Act neither impact reputation
or independence of patients sufficiently to constitute invasion of right or liberty protected by four-
teenth amendment).
In Roe v. Wade, the Court declared that "[w]here certain 'fundamental rights' are involved, the
Court has held that regulations limiting these rights may be justified only by a 'compelling state
interest,' Kramer v. Union Free School District, 395 U.S. 621, 627 (1969); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394
U.S. 618, 634 (1969); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 298, 406 (1963)." 41Q U.S. at 155. In all three of
the cases relied on by the Court, however, the intrusion that triggered the strict standard of scrutiny
was very substantial. In Kramer, the Court reviewed legislation that denied a citizen the right to vote.
395 U.S. at 627. In Shapiro, the Court reviewed classifications that penalized the exercise of the funda-
mental right. 394 U.S. at 634. In Sherbert, the Court emphasized that denying benefits to persons who
practiced certain religious beliefs effectively penalized them for exercising their first amendment
rights. 374 U.S. at 406.
Since Roe v. Wade, the Court continually required a significant intrusion upon fundamental
rights before applying strict scrutiny. See, e.g., Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 383 (1978) (opinion
for the Court written by Marshall, J., and joined by Brennan, Blackmun, White, JJ., and Burger, C.J.)
("critical examination" is appropriate when government classification "significantly interferes with the
exercise of" fundamental right to marry); id. at 387 (rigorous judicial scrutiny appropriate when
legislation "does interfere directly and substantially with the right to marry" and citizens "suffer a serious
intrusion into their freedom of choice in an area in which we have held such freedom to be fundamen-
tal") (emphasis added); id. at 397 (Powell, J., concurring in judgment) ("the Court has yet to hold
that all regulation touching upon marriage implicates a 'fundamental right' triggering the most ex-
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Justice O'Connor's test does not subject every state abortion regula-
tion to the "compelling state interest" test and strict scrutiny. "Rather,
the right [identified in Roe] protects the woman from unduly burdensome
interference with her freedom to decide whether to terminate her preg-
nancy."' 155 If the impact of the regulation is not unduly burdensome,
"then [the Court's] ... inquiry is limited to whether the state law bears
'some rational relationship to legitimate state purposes.' ",156 Justice
O'Connor further defined what the Court had traditionally considered an
undue burden: "The abortion cases demonstrate that an 'undue burden'
has been found for the most part in situations involving absolute obsta-
cles or severe limitations on the abortion decision."'
57
Justice O'Connor's "unduly burdensome" standard allows the states
flexibility in drafting their abortion laws. WithinJustice O'Connor's "un-
duly burdensome" standard there is no differentiation by trimesters.
acting judicial scrutiny"); id at 403 (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment) (state laws "may 'signifi-
cantly interfere with decisions to enter into the marital relationship.' That kind of interference,
however, is not a sufficient reason for invalidating every law reflecting a legislative judgment that
there are relevant differences .... ); Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499 (1977)
(Powell, J., plurality opinion) ("the usual judicial deference" is unwarranted when the government
"undertakes such intrusive regulation [of a fundamental protected right]").
The Court has also required a significant intrusion upon the abortion right before it will apply
heightened scrutiny in a limited number of instances. These instances occur in pre-Akron and abor-
tion-funding cases. Roe, 410 U.S. at 156 ("statute's infringement upon Roe's rights"); Bolton, 410
U.S. at 192 ("unduly restrict the woman's right of privacy"); id. at 193 ("impermissibly restricts the
physician's right"); id. at 198 ("unduly restrictive of the patient's rights" and "substantial and irra-
tional roadblocks"); id at 199 ("unduly infringes on the physician's right to practice"); Danforth, 428
U.S. 52, 66-67 (1976) ("unduly burdensome interference"); Maher, 432 U.S. 464, 473-43 (1977)
("the right protects the woman from unduly burdensome interference"); Bellotti 11, 443 U.S. 622, 640
(1979) (opinion of Powell, J.) (the question the Court must answer is whether a statute "does not
unduly burden the right to seek an abortion"). See generally Thornburgh, 476 U.S. 747, 829 (1986)
(O'Connor, J., dissenting); Akron, 462 U.S. 416, 452-53, 462 n.8 (1983) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
155 462 U.S. at 461 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor cited precedent demonstrating
that the Court traditionally requires that a law substantially infringe upon a right before it will invoke
heightened scrutiny:
The requirement that state interference "infringe substantially" or "heavily burden" a right
before heightened scrutiny is applied is not novel in our fundamental-rights jurisprudence,
or restricted to the abortion context. In San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, we
observed that we apply "strict judicial scrutiny" only when legislation may be said to have
"'deprived,' 'infringed,' or 'interfered' with the free exercise of some fundamental person
right or liberty." If the impact ... does not rise to the level appropriate for our strict
scrutiny, then our inquiry is limited to whether the state law bears "some rational relation-
ship to legitimate state purposes."
Id. (citations omitted).
Justice O'Connor also cited cases in the first amendment area as examples that the Court first
requires the law "infringe substantially," Gibson v. Florida Legislative Comm., 372 U.S. 539, 545
(1963), or that there is a "significant encroachment upon personal liberty," Bates v. City of Little
Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 524 (1960), before it applies heightened scrutiny.
156 462 U.S. at 462 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
157 Id. at 464. Justice Scalia severely criticized the notion of an "undue burden" in his concurring
opinion in Webster. He stated that
Justice O'Connor would nevertheless uphold the law because it "does not impose an undue
burden on a woman's abortion decision." This conclusion is supported by the observation
that the required tests impose only a marginal cost on the abortion procedure, far less of an
increase than the cost-doubling hospitalization requirement invalidated in Akron. The fact
that the challenged regulation is less costly than what we struck down in Akron tells us only
that we cannot decide the present case on the basis of that earlier decision. It does not tell
us whether the present requirement is an "undue burden," and I know of no basis for
determining that this particular burden (or any other for that matter) is "due."
109 S. Ct 3040, 3066 n.* (1989)(Scalia,J., concurring).
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Therefore, her approach does not require the states to promote certain
state interests within defined trimesters of pregnancy. The state statute
and its companion state objective are tested throughout the pregnancy.
Thus, both the state interest in promoting maternal health and pro-
tecting potential life are considered compelling throughout the
pregnancy.
1 5 8
Justice O'Connor's "unduly burdensome" standard relieves the con-
flict that Roe and its progeny created. The "unduly burdensome" stan-
dard does not employ the two judicial methods that helped create the
conflict. First, the Court would no longer strictly scrutinize all abortion
regulations; rather, the Court would reserve its highest level of scrutiny
for regulations that unduly burden the woman's decision. 59 By not
strictly scrutinizing all regulations, the Court allows the states to deter-
mine their own policy in the abortion area. Strict scrutiny necessarily
entails a balancing of interests through which the Court replaces the
state's policy choices with its own.160 Thus, by not strictly scrutinizing all
regulations, the Court will interfere less with states' policy choices.
By abandoning the per se rule of strict scrutiny, the "unduly burden-
some" standard leads the Court away from substantive due process,1 61
158 Akron, 462 U.S. at 459-61 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
The fallacy inherent in the Roe framework is apparent: just because the State has a compel-
ling interest in ensuring maternal safety once an abortion may be more dangerous than
childbirth, it simply does not follow that the State has no interest before that point that
justifies state regulations to ensure that first-trimester abortions are performed as safely as
possible.
The state interest in potential human life is likewise extant throughout pregnancy. In
Roe, the Court held that although the State had an important and legitimate interest in
protecting life, that interest could not become compelling until the point at which the fetus
was viable. The difficulty with this analysis is clear: potential life is not less potential in the
first weeks of pregnancy than it is at viability or afterward. At any stage in pregnancy, there
is the potential for human life .... The choice of viability as the point at which the state
interest in potential life becomes compelling is no less arbitrary than choosing any point
before viability or any point afterward. Accordingly, I believe that the State's interest in
protecting human life exists throughout the pregnancy.
Id. at 460-61.
Justice O'Connor reviewed the Ohio regulations in her Akron dissent. She found that the Act's
hospitalization requirement, informed consent provision, and the 24-hour waiting period did not
create an "undue burden" on the woman's abortion decision. Thus, she would have upheld the
regulations. Id. at 456.
159 See supra note 153-54. Justice O'Connor defines an "undue burden" as those "situations in-
volving absolute obstacles or severe limitations on the abortions decision." Akron, 462 U.S. at 464
(O'ConnorJ., dissenting). For example, she cites state abortion laws that prohibited all or nearly all
abortions. She stated that
In Roe, the Court invalidated a Texas statute that criminalized all abortions except those
necessary to save the life of the mother. In Danforth, the Court invalidated a state prohibi-
tion of abortion by saline amniocentesis because the ban had "the effect of inhibiting...
the vast majority of abortions after the first 12 weeks. The Court today a acknowledges that
the regulation in Danforth effectively represented "a complete prohibition on abortions in
certain circumstances." In Danforth, the Court also invalidated state regulations requiring
parental or spousal consent as a prerequisite to a first-trimester abortion because the con-
sent requirements effectively and impermissibly delegated a "veto power" to parents and
spouses during the first trimester of pregnancy.
Id. (citation omitted). See also id. at 461 n.8 (examples of the Court and individual justices applying
the "unduly burdensome" standard in abortion cases).
160 See supra notes 10 & 147.
161 The "unduly burdensome" standard would not produce the negative effects that have re-
sulted from the Court's strict scrutiny. First, the Court would not play the role of super-legislature.
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the second judicial method that helped create the conflict. Substantive
due process doctrine allows the Court to balance competing interests in
the abortion issue by judging the "wisdom" and "propriety" of the law.
This process results in judicial opinions that reflect the justices' beliefs as
to the correct solution to a problem and replaces those of the legisla-
tures. Since Roe, this process preempted the states' ability to affect their
interests in abortion and has added to the conflict over which institution,
the Court or state legislatures, would have primary responsibility for con-
trolling abortion. The "unduly burdensome" standard would eliminate
these two judicial methods and relieve the conflict between the Court
and the states.' 62
IV. Webster: A Break with the Past and a Door to the Future
Webster v. Reproductive Health Services 163 is a transition in the Court's
abortion jurisprudence. It signals the end of Roe's trimester framework
and the Court's use of substantive due process in its abortion decisions.
Webster, however, does not establish a new standard of review that the
Court will apply in future abortion cases. Nonetheless, it marks the end
of the era in which the Court strictly scrutinized all state abortion laws
that impacted a woman's choice.
Webster presents the alternative standards of review that the Court
may apply in future abortion cases. The plurality's standard determined
whether the Missouri regulations "permissibly further[ed]' 164 a legiti-
mate state interest. That standard, however, is only adopted by a plural-
ity. 165 Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion reflected her "unduly
burdensome" standard, which she espoused in her Akron and Thornburgh
dissents. 166 While a majority of the justices did not adopt Justice
O'Connor's approach, the plurality made reference to the "unduly bur-
The Court would not strictly scrutinize all abortion regulations and, therefore, not review the state's
policy choices. This approach provides greater deference to state legislatures and increases their
ability to draft legislation that withstands judicial review.
Second, the "unduly burdensome" standard does away with the trimester framework, allowing
states to experiment with various responses to the abortion controversy. Third, this standard's def-
erence to legislative judgment allows states to fine-tune their legislation to local opinion. This ability
may help relieve the abortion controversy nationally and relieve the conflict between the Court and
the states. Lastly, the standard is true to the principles of federalism and the horizontal separation of
powers between state and federal government. The Court would return to its role as an interpreter
of the Constitution and protector of individual rights under the "unduly burdensome" standard. It
gives states primary responsibility for this social issue.
162 justice O'Connor does not advocate completely deferring to the state legislature's judgement
in the abortion area, It was argued in Akron that the state legislature should be able to define what
constitutes an undue burden, 462 U.S. 416, 465 n.10 (O'Connor,J., dissenting). justice O'Connor
rejected this argument: "[t]he "unduly burdensome" standard is appropriate not because it incorpo-
rates deference to legislative judgement at the threshold stage of analysis, but rather because of the
limited nature of the fundamental right that has been recognized in the abortion cases." Id.
163 109 S. Ct. 3040 (1989).
164 Id. at 3057.
165 ChiefJustice Rehnquist is joined byjustices White and Kennedy in parts II-D and III, dealing
with the viability-testing provision. Id. at 3046. It is within this section that the plurality applies the
"permissibly furthers" standard. Id. at 3057, 3058.
166 See supra text accompanying notes 155-58.
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densome" standard within its opinion.167 It would appear that Justice
O'Connor's standard continues to be a viable alternative.' 68 Thus, Web-
ster represents a passage from the trimester framework and strict scrutiny
of the Roe era to a new, as yet, unknown standard. The Court will decide
whether to adopt a modified rationality standard, as exemplified by the
plurality's "impermissibly furthers" standard, orJustice O'Connor's "un-
duly burdensome" standard.
A. The Court Rejects the Role of Super-Legislature
Webster's plurality opinion is a marked change from the Court's opin-
ions in Roe and its progeny. The plurality's review of the Missouri law is
restrained. It does not seek to find an antiabortion intent upon which to
strike down the law. 169 Rather than strictly scrutinizing the abortion reg-
ulations, as it had consistently done in prior abortion decisions, the
Court upheld the Missouri regulations under a modified rationality stan-
dard. The Court also refused to reevaluate Missouri's policy decisions.
The Court faced the Missouri statute's four provisions regulating
abortion. These provisions included: 1) the preamble; 2) the prohibition
on using public facilities or employees to perform abortions; 3) the pro-
hibition on publicly funding abortion counseling; and 4) the requirement
that physicians conduct viability tests prior to performing certain abor-
tions. 170 It is insightful into the Court's new approach that it addressed
these provisions "seriatim."' 7' The Court's distinct and separate review
of each provision signals a departure from the past.' 72 The Court's prior
opinions often looked to the antiabortion impact of the whole statute to
find an impermissible burden on the woman's right to an abortion.'
73
The plurality begins its Webster opinion by signaling that it will judge each
167 See Webster, 109 S. Ct. at 3052 ("circumstance is more easily remedied and thus considered less
burdensome")(emphasis added); id. ("it is difficult to see how any procreational choice is burdened by
the State's ban on the use of facilities or employees") (emphasis added).
168 Justice Blackmun also appeared to adopt the language of the "unduly burdensome" standard.
See Webster, 109 S. Ct. at 3074 ("decisions rest on this Court's reasoned and accurate judgment that
.. requirements unduly burdened the right of women to terminate a pregnancy... while substantially
less restrictive regulations were not unduly burdensome .... )(emphasis added).
169 See supra notes 119-20 and accompanying text. See generally Akron, 462 U.S. 416 (1983). This
intent element was key in the Eighth Circuit's holding that the declaration that life begins at concep-
tion was unconstitutional, 851 F.2d 1071, 1075-76 (1988), that the restriction on the use of state
resources to counsel or encourage abortion was unconstitutional, id. at 1080, and that the prohibi-
tion against public employees performing or assisting abortions was unconstitutional. Id. at 1013.
The Supreme Court did not use this antiabortion-intent argument. Cf. supra note 126.
170 109 S. Ct. at 3049.
171 Id. Seriatim means to approach a group of issues "[s]everally; separately; individually; [or] one
by one." BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY 1226 (5th ed. 1979).
172 See, e.g., Thornburgh, 476 U.S. 747 (1986)(mandatory information about risks of abortion, pos-
sible availability of medical assistance and child support, and availability of printed matter concern-
ing characteristics of fetus and organizations to assist with alternatives to abortion, and provisions
regulating postviability abortions held unconstitutional); Akron, 462 U.S. 416 (1983)(holding uncon-
stitutional a city ordinance requiring physician to inform pregnant woman, before her consent to
abortion, of state of development of fetus, risks of abortion, and availability of assistance from agen-
cies; a 24-hour waiting period after consent; a requirement of hospitalization for all second-trimester
abortions; a parental-consent requirements; a disposal-of-fetal-remains provision).
173 See supra text accompanying notes 119-32.
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provision independently and not aggregate their collective impact on a
woman's decision.
1. Preamble
The plurality's opinion on the preamble's constitutionality breaks
from the past because it narrowly reads the Court's abortion precedent
and defers to the state's policy choices. The Missouri law's preamble
stated "findings" that " 'It]he life of each human being begins at concep-
tion,' and that '[u]nborn children have protectable interests in life,
health, and well-being.' "74 The preamble mandated that state law be
"interpreted to provide unborn children with 'all the rights, privileges,
and immunities available to other persons, citizens, and residents of this
state,' subject to the Constitution" and Supreme Court precedent. 175
The Court rejected the Eighth Circuit's holding that the preamble
violated the Court's dictum in Akron that "'a state may not adopt one
theory of when life begins to justify its regulation of abortions.'" 176 The
Court found that the court of appeals had applied the dictum too
broadly. It said that the dictum in Akron meant only that "a State could
not 'justify' an abortion regulation otherwise invalid under Roe v. Wade
on the ground that it embodied the State's view about when life be-
gins."' 177 The Court rejected the appellees argument that the preamble
would be an operative part of the statute used to implement the other
abortion regulations. Therefore, the preamble did not fall under Akron's
dictum because it "does not by its terms regulate abortion or any other
aspect of appellee's medical practice."'178 The Court also rejected a sec-
ond argument that the preamble could proscribe certain forms of contra-
ception that act upon a fertilized egg.'7 9 Here again, the Court found
that the preamble had not been applied in such a manner. Therefore, the
Court would not address the preamble's constitutionality based on its
potential to restrict the availability of contraceptives.
The Court's review of the preamble retreated from prior decisions
that expressed disdain for state legislation embodying an antiabortion
objective.' 0 The Court emphasized that Roe "'implies no limitation on
the authority of a state to make a value judgment favoring childbirth over
abortion.., and [that] [t]he preamble can be read simply to express that
sort of value judgment."'' Webster's deference to state policy favoring
childbirth over abortion is a break from the Court's opinions in Akron and
174 109 S. Ct. at 3049.
175 Id.
176 Id.
177 Id. at 3050.
178 Id.
179 Id. Justice Blackmun argued that the state could use the preamble to prohibit the use of cer-
tain contraceptives: "because the preamble defines fetal life as beginning upon 'the fertilization of
the ovum of a female by a sperm of a male' the provision also unconstitutionally burdens the use of
contraceptive devices, such as the IUD and the 'morning after' pill, which may operate to prevent
pregnancy only after conception as defined in the statute." Id. at 3068 n.1 (BlackmunJ., dissenting)
(citation omitted).
180 See supra text accompanying notes 128-31.
181 109 S. Ct. at 3050.
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Thornburgh in which such an intent triggered the Court's heightened
scrutiny.
Justice O'Connor addressed the preamble in her concurring opin-
ion. She agreed with the plurality's decision that the preamble does not
"affect a woman's decision to have an abortion" and, therefore, does not
violate the dictum of Akron. 182 As to the argument that the state may use
the preamble to prevent certain post-fertilization contraceptives, Justice
O'Connor again agreed that until the state uses the preamble in such a
manner, the Court should not pass on such a hypothetical application.
Justice O'Connor intimated that such an application would be unconsti-
tutional under Griswold.183
Justice Blackmun, joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall, dis-
sented from the plurality's opinion and found that the preamble violated
the Court's abortion precedent. Justice Blackmun approved both argu-
ments in favor of striking down the preamble. First, he found that the
preamble would be used to "regulate abortion." The state intended it to
be a "general principle that would fill in whatever interstices [that] may
be present in existing abortion precedents." 184 Therefore, it violated the
dictum of Akron, as interpreted by the plurality, that a "State could not
'justify' an abortion regulation otherwise invalid under Roe v. Wade on
the ground that it embodied the State's view about when life begins."185
Second, Justice Blackmun found that the preamble "unconstitutionally
burden[ed] the use of contraceptive devices, . . . which may operate to
prevent pregnancy only after conception .... -186
The plurality's opinion and Justice Blackmun's dissenting opinion
represent the new and old approach respectively in the Court's abortion
jurisprudence. The opinions differ on the deference given to the state
legislature's policies. The plurality construed the preamble narrowly and
did not strain to determine, prematurely, its constitutionality. In doing
so, the plurality allowed the state to make policy encouraging childbirth
over abortion because there was no evidence that such a policy impli-
cated a woman's abortion decision. In contrast, Justice Blackmun's dis-
sent strikes down the preamble because the state could potentially apply
it to restrict contraceptives. Justice Blackmun's opinion would prevent
the state from making a legislative policy choice. The plurality's deferen-
tial approach breaks away from the strict scrutiny with which the dissent
and prior abortion decisions reviewed abortion regulations.
182 Id. at 3059.
183 Justice O'Connor discussed whether the preamble conflicted with Griswold: "It may be correct
that the use of postfertilization contraceptive devices is constitutionally protected by Griswold and its
progeny but, as with a woman's abortion decision, nothing in the record or the opinions below
indicates that the preamble will affect a woman's decision to practice contraception." Id.
Justice O'Connor's opinion is more concerned with the integrity of the general right to privacy
than is the plurality. By affirmatively citing Griswold as a limit on the state's ability to regulate an
individual's right to practice contraception, Justice O'Connor evidenced her support for a general
right to privacy. This approach follows her "unduly burdensome" standard, which recognizes the
right to privacy and a woman's right to choose an abortion as part of that right.
184 Id.at3068n.l.
185 Id. at 3050.
186 Id.
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2. Prohibiting the Use of Public Facilities or Employees to Perform
Abortions
A majority of the Webster Court upheld the Missouri provision that
prohibited spending public funds to assist or perform an abortion, not
necessary to save the life of the mother.' 8 7 The statute also applied the
same restriction on using public facilities and public employees acting
"within the scope of [their] employment."'' 8 8 The Court reversed the
district court and the court of appeals which had struck down the
restrictions.1
8 9
In reversing the court of appeals, the Court relied on its reasoning in
prior abortion-funding cases, that "the State's decision here to use public
facilities and staff to encourage childbirth over abortion 'places no gov-
ernmental obstacle in the path of a woman who chooses to terminate her
pregnancy.' "190 The Court found that the Missouri funding restriction
was less burdensome on a woman than restrictions in prior funding
cases.' 9 1 Once again, the plurality opinion deferred to the state's
187 See Reproductive Health Servs. v. Webster, 851 F.2d 1071, 1077 n.9 (8th Cir. 1988)(text of
Missouri Act prohibiting expenditure of public funds for abortion).
Numerous other states have similar abortion-funding restrictions. See, eg., ARnz. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 35-196.02 (Supp. 1988) (funding restriction); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-1630 (1981) (facilities
restriction); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 26-4-105.5, 26-15-104.5 (Supp. 1987); COLO. CONST. art. V, § 50
(Supp. 1988) (funding facilities and employees restrictions); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 23, 5-5, 6-1, 7-1
(Smith-Hurd 1988) (funding restriction); IND. CODE. ANN. § 16-10-3-3 (Burns 1983) (funding restric-
tion); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 311.715 (1983 & Supp. 1988) (funding restriction); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 40:1299.34.5 (Supp. 1989) (funding restriction); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 261.28 (West Supp. 1989);
§ 393.07 subd. I 1 (West Supp. 1989); § 256B.40 (West 1982 & Supp. 1989) (funding restriction);
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:40-6.1 (West 1981) (funding and facilities restrictions); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 5101.55(C) (Anderson 1984) (funding restriction); PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 3215 (Purdon
1983 & Supp. 1989); tit. 62 § 453 (Purdon Supp. 1988) (funding restriction); S.D. CODIFIED LAwS
ANN. § 28-6-4.5 (1984) (funding restriction); UTAH CODE ANN. 26-18-4 (1989) (funding restriction);
Wis. STAT. ANN. § 59.07 (136) (West 1988); § 66.04(1)(m) (West Supp. 1988) (funding restriction);
Wyo. STAT. § 35-6-117 (1988) (funding restriction).
188 851 F.2d at 1077 n.9.
189 The district court held that the restriction on the use of public funds or public employees to
perform or assist abortions violated the eighth amendment. Reproductive Health Servs. v. Webster,
662 F. Supp. 407, 429 (W.D. Mo. 1987). The state could use the provision to prevent the use of
public money or employees from transporting female prisoners for elective abortions. Id. The court
found this possible application to be cruel and unusual punishment. Id.
The court also found that the restriction on using public facilities and employees differed from a
restriction on using public funds. The court distinguished the Supreme Court's decision in Poelker
v. Doe, 432 U.S. 519 (1977), on that distinction. Poelker upheld a St. Louis policy prohibiting a
public hospital from performing nontherapeutic abortions. Id. at 428. The district court interpreted
the policy upheld in Poelker as a cost-avoidance measure and distinguished it from the Missouri provi-
sion which prohibited the use of public facilities even if the patient paid for the services. Id. The
court buttressed this distinction with the Eighth Circuit's opinion in Nyberg v. City of Virginia, 667
F.2d 754 (8th Cir. 1982), which distinguished a prohibition against using funds from broader restric-
tions that have a "secondary effect" of restricting a woman's access to abortion facilities that she is
willing to pay for. 662 F. Supp. at 428.
The court of appeals distinguished Supreme Court precedent that upheld public-funding
prohibitions. The court of appeals "reasoned that the ban on the use of public facilities 'could
prevent a woman's chosen doctor from performing an abortion because of his unprivileged status at
other hospitals or because a private hospital adopted a similar anti-abortion stance.'" Webster, 109 S.
Ct. at 3051-52 (citation omitted). The court found that " '[t]o prevent access to a public facility does
more than demonstrate a political choice in favor of childbirth; it clearly uiarrows and in some cases
forecloses the availability of abortion to women.'" Id. at 3051.
190 109 S. Ct. at 3052.
191 The Missouri restriction that prevented women from obtaining abortions in a public hospital
was "less burdensome, than indigence, [the burden facing women in prior abortion-funding cases]
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"'value judgment favoring childbirth over abortion'" and its means of
implementing that choice.'1 2
In this section of its opinion, the plurality refused to impose a differ-
ent policy choice on Missouri because it opted to promote childbirth.
The Court rejected the court of appeals' argument that the Missouri law
differed from prior abortion-funding cases because " 'all of the public
facility's costs in providing abortion services are recouped when the pa-
tient pays.' " The Court said that "[n]othing in the Constitution requires
States to enter or remain in the business of performing abortions....
[Our precedent] support[s] the view that the State need not commit any
resources to facilitating abortions, even if it can turn a profit by doing
so. ... ."193
Justice O'Connor wrote a concurring opinion to the plurality's pub-
lic-funding restriction section. She agreed with the plurality that the con-
stitutionality of the provisions "follows directly" from the Court's prior
abortion-funding opinions. Once again, Justice O'Connor was more cau-
tious than the plurality, and she warned that there may be an unconstitu-
tional application of the ban on using public facilities. 194 Such a ban may
be unconstitutional if a state were to apply the ban broadly to prevent
private hospitals from performing abortions that use public water, sew-
age lines, or hospitals that lease publicly-owned equipment or land. 95
justice O'Connor, however, left this decision for a future case when, and
if, the state applied the ban in such a manner.
Justice Blackmun, writing for Justices Brennan and Marshall, dis-
sented from the Court's holding regarding the ban on public resources
for nontherapeutic abortions. He argued that the Court's decision
should not flow from its prior abortion-funding cases. First, he cited the
strong dissents in those cases. 196 Second, he distinguished the Missouri
law from those in prior cases because Missouri had not simply "with-
drawn from the business of abortion, but had taken affirmative steps to
assure that abortions are not performed by private physicians in private
institutions." '19 7 Justice Blackmun argued that Missouri's public-funding
restriction went beyond a means of favoring childbirth over abortion to
impose "the full force of [the state's] economic power and control over
essential facilities"' 9 8 to prevent women from exercising their constitu-
tional right to choose an abortion. Justice Blackmun rejected the argu-
ment that the ban left a woman with the same choices as if the state had
not chosen to operate public hospitals; rather "the public facility ban




194 Id. at 3059-60.
195 Id.
196 Id. at 3068 n.1 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
197 Id. The Missouri law went beyond previous state funding restrictions because it broadly de-
fined "public facility" to include facilities that used "public equipment, or any physical asset owned,
leased, or controlled" by Missouri.
198 Id.
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leaves the pregnant woman with far fewer choices, or, for those too sick
or too poor to travel, perhaps no choices at all." 199
The Webster plurality and dissenting opinions approached Missouri's
statute differently. The plurality deferred to the state's determination
that public-funding restrictions are an appropriate means to implement
its policy favoring childbirth over abortion. The plurality did not strain
to find prematurely an unconstitutional application of the restriction.
The dissent, however, strictly scrutinized the ban, finding that the state
could potentially apply it in ways that violate the Court's precedent. The
dissenting opinion overreaches. It would strike down the statute because
it could be unconstitutionally applied. This approach frustrates the
state's attempt to pass legislation that will withstand judicial review be-
cause the Court does not presume good faith on the part of the legisla-
ture. Rather, the Court strikes down the legislation because it presumes
the legislature passed the law in bad faith, to frustrate the Court's abor-
tion precedent.
3. Prohibiting Publicly-Funded Abortion Counseling
The Missouri Act contained three provisions relating to " 'encourag-
ing or counseling a woman to have an abortion not necessary to save her
life.' " It prohibited using public funds for this purpose, prohibited pub-
lic employees from engaging in such speech while within the scope of
their employment, and prohibited such speech in public facilities. Both
the district court and the court of appeals struck down these three provi-
sions.200 Missouri appealed only the decision on the public-funding
provision.
The first issue facing the Court was whether the provision prohibited
conduct of all public employees within all public facilities, as the appel-
lees argued, or whether it was simply an "instruction to the State's fiscal
officers not to allocate funds for abortion counseling, " 20 1 as the state ar-
gued. The Court adopted the state's interpretation. 202 As a result, the
appellees contended that they were no longer adversely affected by the
provision and that there was no longer a case or controversy. 203 The
199 Id.
200 The district court struck down the provisions because they were unconstitutionally vague and
they interfered with the physician's discretion to give advice to his or her patients regarding abor-
tion. The court found that these effects presented a significant barrier to a "woman's right to con-
sult with her physician and exercise her freedom of choice." Reproductive Health Servs. v. Webster,
662 F. Supp. 407, 427 (W.D. Mo. 1987).
The court also rejected the state's interpretation of the statute as applying only to state and local
officials responsible for expending public funds. The court stated that the language "certainly is
broad enough" to include "anyone who is paid from" public funds. Id. at 425.
The court of appeals affirmed the district courtjudgment. The court agreed that the statute was
vague and implicated constitutional rights of speech and abortion. Reproductive Health Servs. v.
Webster, 851 F.2d 1071, 1077-79 (1988). The court also found that the ban on counseling and
encouraging was an unconstitutional obstacle to the woman's freedom to make an informed choice
whether to have an abortion. The provision was not a legitimate means of implementing the state
policy favoring childbirth because it prevented women "from making a fully informed and intelligent
choice." Id. 1080.
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Court thus directed the court of appeals to vacate the district court judg-
ment and dismissed the appellees' claim. Both Justice O'Connor, con-
curring, and Justice Blackmun, dissenting, agreed with the plurality,
unless the state later interpreted the provision to differ from the one ac-
cepted by the Court.20 4
4. Viability-Testing Requirement
The viability-testing provision presented the Court with the most di-
rect challenge to Roe and its trimester framework. Within this portion of
the plurality's opinion, ChiefJustice Rehnquist severely criticized the tri-
mester approach. The plurality found a conflict between the testing re-
quirement and prior abortion cases. Instead of striking down the
Missouri provision, the plurality used this opportunity to criticize Roe.
The viability-testing provision provided that:
Before a physician performs an abortion on a woman he has reason to
believe is carrying an unborn child of twenty or more weeks gesta-
tional age, the physician shall first determine if the unborn child is
viable by using and exercising that degree of care, skill, and profi-
ciency commonly exercised by the ordinary skillful, careful, and pru-
dent physician engaged in similar practice under the same or similar
conditions. In making this determination of viability, the physician
shall perform or cause to be performed such medical examinations
and tests as are necessary to make a finding of gestational age, weight,
and lung maturity of the unborn child and shall enter such findings
and determinations of viability in the medical record of the mother.20 5
The provision could be interpreted in different ways. Thus, the
Court's first question was whether the provision required doctors to per-
form tests to determine gestational age, fetal weight, and lung maturity,
as the district court and court of appeals found; or whether the provision
required the doctor to make only those tests that are useful in making the
subsidiary findings as to viability. The plurality found that the lower
courts committed "plain error" in their statutory interpretation and vio-
lated the "well-accepted canons of statutory interpretation" practiced in
Missouri, interpreting the second sentence to mandate the specified
tests. The Supreme Court, however, determined that the viability-testing
provision's second sentence "require[d] only those tests that are useful
to making subsidiary findings as to viability." 20 6 The plurality argued
that to interpret the second sentence to require such tests in all circum-
204 Id. at 3060 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
205 Various states have similar viability-testing requirements. Mo. ANN. STAT. 188.029 (Vernon
1989). See also PA. CONS. STAT. ANN., tit. 18 §§ 3210, 3211 (Purdon 1983 & Supp. 1989). See generally
ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 36-2301 (1956); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 20-16-706 (1987); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 390.001(5) (West 1986); IDAHO CODE § 18-608(3); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, 81-26 (Smith-Hurd
Supp. 1989); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-1-58.5-7 (Bums 1985); IowA CODE ANN. § 707-10 (West 1979);
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 311.780 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1983); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:87.5 (1986);
§ 40:1299.35.4 (Supp. 1989); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 145.415, .412 subd. 3 (West 1989); MoNr. CoDE
ANN. § 50-20-108, -109(c) (1987); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-330 (1985); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAw § 4161
(McKinney 1985); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.1-05 (1981); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63 §§ 1-732, -734
(West 1984); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 76-7-307 to -308 (1978); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 940.15 (West Supp.
1988); Wvo. STAT. § 35-6-104 (1988).
206 109 S. Ct. at 3055.
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stances, "including when the physician's reasonable professional judg-
ment indicates that the tests would be irrelevant to determining viability
or even dangerous to the mother and the fetus, ... would conflict with
the first sentence's requirement that a physician apply his reasonable pro-
fessional skill and judgment."
20 7
After interpreting the provision as requiring only those tests that are
useful in determining viability, the plurality proceeded through a step-
by-step analysis of the viability-testing provision. The plurality's analysis
undercut the Roe trimester framework, but purported to leave the hold-
ing intact.208 The plurality first acknowledged that the state intended the
viability-testing provision to promote its interest in potential life.20 9 The
plurality acknowledged that Roe grants a state a compelling interest in
potential life, which becomes compelling upon viability. The plurality
next illustrated the conflict between the "method" for determining via-
bility, provided by the Missouri provision, and the Court's prior decision
in Coluatti v. Franklin.210 Coluatti held that determining viability was a
"matter for the judgment of the responsible attending physician. '21'
"Neither the legislature nor the courts may proclaim one of the elements
entering into the ascertainment of viability - be it weeks of gestation or
fetal weight or any other factor - as the determinant of when the State
has a compelling interest in the life or health of the fetus." 21 2 The plu-
rality found a conflict between Coluatti and the Missouri provision. It
found "[t]o the extent that [the Missouri provision] regulates the method
for determining viability, it undoubtedly does superimpose state regula-
tion on the medical determination of whether a particular fetus is
viable." 21
3
After determining that the Missouri provision conflicted with the
Court's precedent, the plurality evaluated Roe's trimester framework in-
stead of simply striking down the provision on the basis of its Colautti
holding.
We think that the doubt cast upon the Missouri statute by these cases
is not so much a flaw in the statute as it is a reflection of the fact that
the rigid trimester analysis of the course of a pregnancy enunciated in
Roe has resulted in subsequent cases like Colautti and Akron making
constitutional law in this area a virtual Procrustean bed.
214
The plurality proceeded to lay out reasons why stare decisis should not
prevent it from reevaluating the Roe trimester framework. First, the plu-
rality noted that stare decisis has less force when the Court is faced with
constitutional cases: "[S]ave for constitutional amendments, this Court is
207 Id.
208 The plurality declined to explicitly overturn Roe: "[t]his case... affords us no occasion to
revisit the holding of Roe, and we leave it undisturbed. To the extent indicated in our opinion, we
would modify and narrow Roe in succeeding cases." Id. at 3058.
209 Id. at 3055.
210 439 U.S. 379 (1979).
211 109 S. Ct. at 3056, citing Coluatti, 439 U.S. at 396.
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the only body to make needed changes. ' 215 Second, the Roe framework's
intricate set of rules do not fit the traditional "notion of a Constitution
cast in general terms .... 216 The plurality questioned the trimester
approach's validity because none of its components, viability and trimes-
ters of pregnancy, appear in the text of the Constitution. Because the
components of the Roe framework are thus not limited by the Constitu-
tion, the Court's opinions have yielded a "web of legal rules that have
become increasingly intricate, resembling a code of regulations rather
than a body of constitutional doctrine." 217 Third, Roe's determination is
arbitrary that viability is the point at which a state's interest in potential
life becomes compelling. The plurality cited Justice O'Connor's Thorn-
burgh dissent, with approval, proposing that "the State's interest [in po-
tential life], if compelling after viability, is equally compelling before
viability." 21 8 The plurality has lost faith in the trimester framework as a
method of constitutional analysis, but it stopped short of overturning
Roe.
2 1 9
In place of the trimester framework, the plurality applied a modified
rationality standard. The viability-testing provisions "permissibly fur-
ther[ed] the State's interest in protecting potential human life" 220 and,
therefore, the plurality upheld the provision. Even though the plurality
acknowledged that the provision would violate the trimester approach, 221
it applied a rationality standard to uphold the provision. By not striking
down the provision on the basis of Roe, the plurality clearly indicated that
it will no longer apply the trimester framework.
Responding to Justice Blackmun's dissent, the plurality described
the problems that Roe's trimester approach has engendered. 222 The plu-
rality, first, distinguished Roe from Griswold. Unlike Roe, Griswold did not
attempt to erect a "framework, complete with detailed rules and distinc-
tions, to govern the cases in which the asserted liberty interest would
apply." 223 Then the plurality recognized the distinction between estab-
lishing a fundamental right within the Constitution and announcing a
framework within which states may regulate that right.22 4 By announcing
215 Id.
216 Id.
217 Id. at 3057.
218 Id.
219 Id. at 3058.
220 Id. at 3057.
221 The viability-testing provision furthered the state's interest in potential life before viability.
Roe's trimester framework, however, does not allow the state to affect its interest in potential life
until the third trimester or viability. Thus, because the viability-testing provision "regulate[d] the
method for determining viability, it undoubtedly ... superimpose[d] state regulation on the medical
determination of whether a particular fetus is viable." Id. at 3056. This regulation violated the Roe
framework as interpreted by Colautti. Rather than strike down the regulation on its precedent, how-
ever, the Court proceeded to question the validity of Roe's trimester framework. Id. at 3056-57.
Although the Court did not explicitly overturn Roe or the trimester framework, Webster demonstrates
that the Court will no longer follow that analytical approach.
222 These problems mirror the negative effects of substantive due process doctrine. See supra text
accompanying notes 56-71.
223 109 S. Ct. at 3057-58.
224 The Court distinguished Griswold on the basis that it did not establish a framework to support
the constitutional right to privacy that it recognized: "Griswold ..., unlike Roe, did not purport to
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a framework in Roe, the Court "sought to deal with areas of medical prac-
tice traditionally subject to state regulation. ' 225 Furthermore, the Court
overstepped its capabilities by attempting to resolve any dispute regard-
ing abortion by "balanc[ing] once and for all" the competing state inter-
ests. 226 As a result, the Court deprived the states of their power to
fashion a response to the abortion issue and prolonged the conflict by its
inability to fashion a workable national solution. This experience, the
plurality stated, "suggests ... that there is wisdom in not unnecessarily
attempting to elaborate the abstract differences between" the varying de-
scriptions of Roe's fundamental right that different justices have es-
poused.22 7 The plurality demonstrated through its language that it is no
longer willing to take on the intricate task of strictly scrutinizing each
abortion regulation. It will defer to a state's choice as to which means
frirther a particular end. What is uncertain at this juncture is what stan-
dard the Court will apply in the future.
Justice O'Connor's opinion is more restrained in its criticism of Roe
than the plurality. Justice O'Connor concurred only with the plurality's
judgment in respect to the viability-testing provision. She did not see a
need to reevaluate Roe in deciding the constitutionality of the Missouri
law. Her concurring opinion demonstrated that she continues to adhere
to the "unduly burdensome" standard. Although her concurrence is not
an explicit endorsement of that standard, she reviewed the viability-test-
ing provision under that approach.228
Justice O'Connor began her opinion by agreeing with the plurality's
interpretation of the viability-testing provision's second sentence. She
agreed that it requires " 'only those tests that are useful to making sub-
sidiary findings as to viability.' ",229 She tempered the plurality's inter-
pretation by adding that the second sentence only requires a physician to
perform those exams that are "not imprudent or careless." 230 Unlike the
plurality, Justice O'Connor did not find that this interpretation conflicted
with any of the Court's abortion precedent and "[t]herefore, there is no
necessity to reexamine the constitutional validity of Roe v. Wade .... 23 1
Justice O'Connor viewed the regulation as a rational means of pro-
moting the state's interest in potential life when viability is possible. 23 2
First, Justice O'Connor interpreted the Court's opinion in Thornburgh as
supporting the view that a state's interest in potential life "does not dif-
adopt a whole framework, complete with detailed rules and distinctions, to govern the cases in which




228 See supra note 16.
229 Webster, 109 S. Ct. at 3060 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
230 Id.
231 Id.
232 By reviewing the viability-testing provision under a rationality standard, Justice O'Connor
demonstrated that she was applying the "unduly burdensome" approach. Under that approach, the
Court applies heightened scrutiny if a regulation imposes an undue burden on the woman's deci-
sion. Justice O'Connor did not find an undue burden, see supra text accompanying note 159, and
'therefore reviewed the provision under a rationality standard, as prescribed by the "unduly burden-
some" approach.
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fer[ ] depending on whether it seeks to further that interest post viability
or when viability is possible .... ",233 Therefore, the viability-testing pro-
vision did not contradict Roe or its progeny because it regulated the
state's interest in potential life when viability is possible.23 4
Second, Justice O'Connor found that the provision did not conflict
with the holding in Colautti that the state may not proclaim the elements
used in determining viability. As interpreted, the "subsidiary findings as
to viability" required by Missouri did not substitute for the physician's
judgment. Therefore, according to Justice O'Connor, the Missouri law
left viability as the "critical point" in determining the state's interest in
potential life and did not conflict with Colautti.235
Lastly, Justice O'Connor addressed the plurality's argument that the
viability-testing provision may impermissibly add to the costs of a sec-
ond-trimester abortion and therefore violate Akron. 23 6 Within this por-
tion of her opinion, Justice O'Connor most clearly applied the "unduly
burdensome" standard, finding the provision constitutional. Justice
O'Connor noted that she continues to consider the Roe trimester frame-
233 109 S. Ct. at 3062. Thornburgh, 476 U.S. 747 (1986), involved, inter alia, a Pennsylvania statute
requiring a "second physician be present during an abortion performed 'when viability is possible.' "
Id. at 769-70 (emphasis added). The Court invalidated the regulation because it lacked a medical-
emergency exception. Idl at 770-71. Justice O'Connor construed this opinion, in which thejustices
did not differentiate between postviability and possible viable, to mean that the "nine Members of
the Thornburgh Court appear to have agreed that it is not constitutionally impermissible for the state
to enact regulations designed to protect the state's interest in potential life when viability is possi-
ble." 109 S. Ct. at 3062.
234 Justice Scalia severely criticized Justice O'Connor's Webster opinion in which she reconciled
the viability-testing provision with the Court's prior viability decisions. In particular, he criticized
the notion of "potential viability":
Similarly irrational is the new concept that Justice O'Connor introduces into the law in
order to achieve her result, the notion of a State's "interest in potential life when viability is
possible." Since "viability" means the mere possibility (not the certainty) of survivability
outside the womb, "possible viability" must mean the possibility of a possibility of
survivability outside the womb. Perhaps our next opinion will expand the third trimester
into the second even further, by approving state action designed to take account of "the
chance of possible viability."
109 S. Ct. at 3066 n* (Scalia, J., concurring).
235 This portion ofJustice O'Connor's Webster opinion indicates she is unwilling to overturn Roe.
Her opinion did not find a conflict between Missouri's viability-testing provision and Roe's holding
that viability is the point at which the state's interest in potential life becomes compelling. IfJustice
O'Connor had wanted to overturn Roe, then she could have found a conflict or reiterated her argu-
ment supporting the "unduly burdensome" standard. Both avenues could have led her to possibly
reconsider Roe. Justice O'Connor's restrained approach illustrates that, although the Court is in a
transition away from Roe, none of the possible alternatives to the Roe framework have the support of
a majority of the justices.
236 A provision of the Ohio law in Akron required that all second-trimester abortions be per-
formed in a fully-licensed hospital. 462 U.S. 416 (1983). The Akron majority found this requirement
imposed "a heavy, and unnecessary, burden" on the woman's decision whether to have an abortion.
Id. at 438. The regulation would doubl[e] the cost of 'women's access to a relatively inexpensive,
otherwise accessible, and safe abortion procedure.'" Id. at 438.
In determining the scope of the "unduly burdensome" standard, it is difficult to determine Jus-
tice O'Connor's position on the Akron hospitalization requirement. She argued that it did not create
an undue burden in her Akron dissent, but cited it as an example of an undue burden in her Webster
concurrence. One may infer that she now considers the Akron requirement an undue burden. In
comparison, Justice O'Connor found that the viability-testing provision in Webster was not an undue
burden because "the cost of examinations and tests that could usefully and prudently be performed
when a woman is 20-24 weeks pregnant to determine whether the fetus is viable would only margin-
ally, if at all, increase the cost of an abortion." 109 S. Ct. at 3063.
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work "problematic. ' 23 7 In its place, she would apply the "unduly bur-
densome" standard, which provides "that, previability, 'a regulation
imposed on a lawful abortion is not unconstitutional unless it unduly
burdens the right to seek an abortion.' ",238 Applying this standard to the
viability-testing provision, she found that "requiring the performance of
examinations and tests useful to determining whether a fetus is viable,
when viability is possible, and when it would not be medically imprudent
to do so, does not impose an undue burden on a woman's abortion deci-
sion. '"239 These tests would only "marginally... increase the cost of an
abortion" 240 and are appropriate to further the state's interest in deter-
mining viability. Because the provision did not impose an undue burden
on the woman's decision, Justice O'Connor upheld the regulation as a
rational means of furthering the state's interest in potential life.
Justice Blackmun dissented, joined by Justices Marshall and Bren-
nan, from the plurality's viability-testing opinion. Justice Blackmun ac-
cused the plurality of creating a constitutional crisis 241 between the
Missouri provision and Roe's trimester framework where none existed.
Justice Blackmun believed that such action was irresponsible and danger-
ous to the women who relied on the fundamental right created in Roe. It
also undercut the Court's credibility. 242 He argued that the plurality's
"permissibly furthers" standard is a disguised rationality standard that
would take the nation's abortion laws back to their pre-Roe standard.
Justice Blackmun criticized the plurality's opinion as "aggressive
misreading" of the statute and a "wooden application of the Roe frame-
work."' 243 InJustice Blackmun's view, the Court should have adhered to
its policy of deferring to a lower courts' interpretation of local law. The
statute would thus require that "the physician ... undertake whatever
tests are necessary to determine gestational age, weight, and lung matur-
ity, regardless of whether these tests are necessary to a finding of viabil-
ity."'244 Under this interpretation, the provision would not pass even a
rationality standard because the tests have "no rational relation to the
State's interest in protecting fetal life."' 245 It was simply "an arbitrary
237 109 S. Ct. at 3063.
238 Id., citing Akron, 462 U.S. at 453. Here again,Justice O'Connor uses an example of the Court
adopting the "unduly burdensome" standard limited to regulations that apply previability. For a
discussion of whether this addition alters the standard, see supra note 16.
It should be noted that the "unduly burdensome" standard is not a new approach for the Court
in the abortion area. The Court applied it in the abortion area in its early decisions. It was not until
Akron that the Court began to continuously abandon that standard and apply strict scrutiny to all
abortion regulations. See supra notes 154-55 & 159.
239 109 S. Ct. at 3063.
240 Id.
241 Id. at 3070 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
242 Justice Blackmun stated that the plurality, by implicitly overturning the Roe framework and by
hinting that it will explicitly overturn Roe in the future, is undermining the faith the public has in the
Court as an institution: "I fear for the integrity of, and public esteem for, this Court." Id. at 3067.
243 Id. at 3069.
244 Id. at 3070.
245 Id. The provision could be construed to mandate amniocentesis at 20 weeks which would
pose significant health risks to the fetus and mother. Id. at n.3.
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imposition of discomfort, risk, and expense" on the woman's decision
that did not relate to any legitimate state interest.24
6
As further evidence that the plurality contrived a "constitutional cri-
sis," Justice Blackmun argued, in accord with Justice O'Connor, that the
plurality's interpretation of the viability-testing provision did not conflict
with Roe or its progeny. 247 Justice Blackmun said that, under Roe, a state
may affect its interest in potential life by prescribing such viability tests.
These tests were a valid means of promoting that interest, ensuring that
"no viable fetus is mistakenly aborted because of the inherent lack of
precision in estimates of gestational age .... ,,248 Thus, according to Jus-
tice Blackmun, the plurality disregarded "traditional canons of construc-
tion and judicial forbearance" to create a constitutional conflict that
allowed them to reevaluate the trimester approach. 249
Justice Blackmun then addressed the plurality's reasons for finding
that Roe's trimester framework is " 'unsound in principle and unworkable
in practice' ":250 (1) the key elements of the trimester approach do not
appear in the text of the Constitution; (2) the Court's abortion decisions
under Roe resemble a regulatory code rather than a body of constitu-
tional doctrine; and (3) the state's interest in potential life should be
compelling throughout the pregnancy.
25 1
In response to the first criticism, Justice Blackmun accused the plu-
rality of skirting the main issue: "whether and to what extent . . . [the]
right to privacy extends to matters of childbearing and family life, includ-
ing abortion .... ,,252 Instead of addressing whether the fundamental
right in Roe is justifiably found in the Constitution, the plurality criticized
Roe's framework because the "Key elements" of the trimester framework
are not found in the text of the Constitution. Justice Blackmun argued
that under the plurality's approach "countless constitutional doc-
trines" 253 would fail. 25 4 Roe's trimester framework is an appropriate
measure which the Court must fashion. It helps define a constitutional
246 Id.
247 Id. at 3070-71. Justice Blackmun agreed with Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion finding
that the viability-testing provision did not conflict with the Court's abortion precedent. Id. at 3071
n.6. The provision, as construed by the plurality, did not conflict with Colautti because it "does
nothing to remove the determination of viability from the purview of the attending physician .. "
Id. Furthermore, the provision did not violate Akron because the regulation was not "unnecessary;" it
was "necessary to the effectuation of the State's compelling interest in the potential human life of
viable fetuses ..... Id.
248 Id. at 3071. Cf. Thornburgh, 476 U.S. 747 (1986) (second-physician requirement when possible
viable fetus struck down for lack of emergency exception).
249 109 S. Ct. at 1071.
250 Id., citing Webster, 109 S. Ct. at 3056.
251 Id. at 3072.
252 Id.
253 Id.
254 Id. Justice Blackmun expounded on the various constitutional doctrines that he argued would
be unconstitutional under the plurality's approach:
The Constitution makes no mention... of the First Amendment's "actual malice" standard
for proving certain libels ... or... the standard for determining when speech is obscene.
Similarly, the Constitution makes no mention of the rational-basis test, or the specific verbal
formulations of intermediate and strict scrutiny by which this Court evaluates claims under
the Equal Protection Clause.
Id. at 3072-73.
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right's scope by balancing individual rights against governmental inter-
ests. "Fashioning such accommodation between individual rights and
the legitimate interests of government. lies at the very heart of consti-
tutional adjudication."
2 55
Justice Blackmun's analysis is correct. The Court will fashion
"judge-made methods" to evaluate the competing interests of individual
rights and government interests. The Court is, however, reluctant to
fashion such doctrine when the underlying right is not embodied in the
text of the Constitution. For example, regarding freedom of speech, the
Constitution contains its most clear and explicit language. The Court,
therefore, is confident in developing doctrine to weigh the competing
interests of individual freedom and government regulation of free speech
because it has explicit constitutional support to do so. 256 In the privacy
area, however, Roe established a right to abortion from within the
"penumbras" of the Constitution. The Court has become increasingly
uneasy fashioning intricate "judge-made methods" for evaluating the
competing rights that Roe recognized because of Roe's nontextual
foundation.
257
Justice Blackmun took issue with the plurality determining that the
trimester framework was invalid because the state's interest in potential
life is present throughout the pregnancy and not only after viability. Jus-
tice Blackmun criticized the plurality's lack of reasoning and described it
as "'it-is-so-because-we-say-so' "258 jurisprudence.25 9 Justice Blackmun
provided a detailed analysis of the reasoning behind viability being the
point at which the state's interest becomes compelling. "The viability
line reflects the biological facts and truths of fetal development," 260 and
justifies the trimester approach and its recognition that viability is the
logical point after which the state may protect the fetus. While Justice
Blackmun's reasons supporting the viability line may appear more intel-
lectually satisfying than the plurality's, the real issue is not the strength of
the various justices' reasoning, but rather who should undertake that rea-
soning process: the Court or state legislatures. With. regard to this issue,
the Webster plurality is not willing to maintain and fine tune a system that
strictly scrutinizes state abortion regulation. It will not engage in the de-
bate over the appropriate way to balance the competing interests in this
area. Justice Blackmun feels, however, that the Court should continue to
strictly scrutinize state abortion statutes by balancing competing interests
and determining which abortion regulations arejustified. Webster retreats
255 Id. at 3073.
256 See, e.g., Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973) (obscenity standard); Brandenburg v. Ohio,
395 U.S. 444 (1969) (first amendment's clear-and-present-danger standard); New York Times v. Sul-
livan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (first amendment's "actual malice" standard for determining libel).
257 Justice Blackmun's argument responding to the plurality's criticism of Roe - that the deci-
sions under Roe resemble a regulatory code rather than a body of constitutional doctrine - parallels
his argument refuting the criticism that the key elements of the trimester approach do not appear in
the text of the Constitution. Justice Blackmun argued that as a result of the plurality's approach the
Court "would have to abandon vast areas of our constitutional jurisprudence." 109 S. Ct. at 3073,
3073-75 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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from the Court's active role in Roe and its progeny to a position in which
the Court gives greater deference to state legislative responses to abor-
tion. This movement will relieve many of the negative effects of the
Court's adherence to the substantive due process approach. It will also
mitigate the conflict between the Court and the states.
261
V. Conclusion: The Future of the Abortion-Regulation Battle
In Roe, the Court initially sought to protect the woman's freedom to
choose whether to terminate her pregnancy. It struck down the Texas
statute which prohibited abortions except when necessary to save the wo-
man's life.262 In doing so, the Court was within its role as protector and
interpreter of a fundamental right to extend the right to privacy to in-
clude a woman's abortion decision. The Court justifiably concluded that
the Texas statute unconstitutionally infringed upon the woman's right to
privacy263 because it clearly negated any freedom of choice a woman had
to choose an abortion.
In Roe, the Court went beyond simply protecting the woman's right
and proposed a framework within which the states could exercise their
right to regulate abortion. By adopting the trimester approach the Court
advanced its own judgment regarding the balance of competing state in-
terests in the abortion area. Roe v. Wade and the Court's trimester frame-
work constituted judicial legislation.
The present conflict between the Supreme Court and the states over
abortion regulation will continue under the Roe v. Wade analysis. The
Court appears to be in transition, however, as evidenced by its Webster
decision, away from the jurisprudence of Roe and its progeny that helped
create the conflict between itself and the state legislatures. It is clear that
the dissenting justices throughout the Roe line of cases became uncom-
fortable with the majority's per se strict scrutiny of state abortion regula-
tions. It was not so much the substantive abortion issues that were
spurring the dissenters to call for a reexamination of Roe. Rather, it was
261 For a discussion of the possible effects of the plurality's standard of review according to Jus-
tice Blackmun, see id. at 3076-77. Justice Blackmun argued that the plurality's "permissibly fur-
thers" standard would abolish abortion because "the State's interest in potential life is compelling as
of the moment of conception, and is therefore served only if abortion is abolished, [and therefore]
every hindrance to a woman's ability to obtain an abortion must be 'permissible.' " Id. at 3076.
Justice Blackmun fears that the plurality's standard does not protect the woman's right to an abor-
tion because "the more severe the hindrance, the more effectively (and permissibly) the State's inter-
est would be furthered. A tax on abortions or a criminal prohibition would both satisfy the
plurality's standard .. " Id. at 3076.
Justice Blackmun's argument illustrates the implications of the Court's choice as to which stan-
dard it will apply to abortion regulations: the "unduly burdensome" standard or a rationality stan-
dard. The "unduly burdensome" standard departs less radically from Roe than does the rationality
standard; it retains heightened constitutional protection for a woman's right to abortion. This ap-
proach may be preferable for its moderation; it does not completely reverse the Court's abortion
jurisprudence and therefore may not create a backlash from supporters of Roe and a woman's right
to abortion. The "unduly burdensome" standard can be viewed as a compromise to the conflict
between the Court and the state legislatures.
262 Roe, 410 U.S. 113, 117-18 (1973).
263 Id. at 164-66.
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NOTES
the role that the Court had chosen to play.2 6 The present conflict has
shown that the Court is ill-suited to strictly scrutinize state abortion legis-
lation to determine its "wisdom" and "propriety." 265 Until the Court
retreats from its stance, the ongoing conflict with the states over regulat-
ing abortion will continue.
Webster contains two possible approaches for the Court to adopt in
the future. First, the Court could return to the pre-Roe era by adopting
the plurality's "modified rationality" standard. Second, the Court could
apply the "unduly burdensome" standard articulated in Justice
O'Connor's Akron dissent and applied in her Webster concurrence. The
Supreme Court should adopt Justice O'Connor's "unduly burdensome"
standard. This standard insures a woman's fundamental right to abor-
tion, but allows states to advance their legitimate maternal health and
potential life interests. Justice O'Connor's position does not require that
the Court abandon the woman's right to an abortion found in Roe. It
simply requires that the Court treat the right under the "unduly burden-
some" standard, its traditional fundamental rights analysis. 266 This anal-
ysis defers to state policy and provides the states with the freedom to
further their legitimate interests, without having to satisfy the Court's
demanding compelling state interest test for every abortion statute.
The "unduly burdensome" standard will not allow a state to regu-
late abortion into nonexistence. 267 The standard requires courts to de-
termine whether the regulations present an "absolute obstacle [ ] or
severe limitation[ ] on the abortion decision." 268 If so, the court must
then examine the regulation under the compelling state interest stan-
dard. The court can uphold the regulation only if it reasonably relates to
a compelling state interest, and is narrowly drawn to affect only that in-
terest.269 Unlike the Court's previous review standard, this framework
does not frustrate the state's legislative process. This approach balances
264 The Court may reacquire the political capital that it may have lost through fashioning the
extensive abortion right if it adopts the "unduly burdensome" standard. Justice White, dissenting in
Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 544 (1977), argued that the Court loses legitimacy
when it creates rights that have no roots in the Constitution:
TheJudiciary... is the most vulnerable and comes nearest to illegitimacy when it deals with
judge-made constitutional law having little or no cognizable roots in the language or even
the design of the Constitution. Realizing that the present construction of the Due Process
Clause represents a major judicial gloss on its terms, as well as on the anticipation of the
Framers, and that much of the underpinning for the broad, substantive application of the
Clause disappears in the conflict between the Executive and the Judiciary in the 1930s and
1940s, the Court should be extremely reluctant to breathe still further substantive content
into the Due Process Clause so as to strike down legislation adopted by a State or city to
promote its welfare. Whenever the Judiciary does so, it unavoidably pre-empts for itself
another part of the governance of the country without express constitutional authority.
See, e.g., Whalen v.Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 597 (1977)("The holding in Lochner has been implicitly re-
jected mafi, times. State legislation which has some effect on individual liber'ty or privacy may not be
held unconstitutional simply because a court finds it unnecessary .... ). ,
265 Historically, the Court has gone through periods of strictly scrutinizing laws under the sub-
stantive due process doctrine only to retreat under federal or state pressbre. See supra notes 10 &
147.
266 See supra notes 153-54.
267 Justice O'Connor's approach still recognizes the fundamental right to abortion within a wo-
man's right to privacy. Akron, 462 U.S. 416, 452 (1983)(O'Connor, J., dissenting).
268 Id. at 462. See supra note 156.
269 Id.
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the woman's fundamental right with legitimate state interests, and there-
fore, relieves the present conflict between the Court and state legisla-
tures over the permissible extent of abortion regulation.
DavidJ. Zampa
